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PREFACE 
This study is an examination of the professional career of Frederick 
Funston from 1901, when he-was commissioned a brigadier.general in the 
regular -army, to 1914, when the American occupation forces under-his com-
mand withdrew from Vera Cruz, Mexico. Little -attention is given to the 
subject's personal life with the-exception of the-introduction and certain 
anecdotes in the -subsequent chapters which the author-considers relevant 
to the ·central theme. The emphasis is -on Funston's conduct as an army 
officer. 
Funston was a popular .figure, especially among westerners; perhaps 
his unorthodox and exciting feats were in th<;, true frontier spirit. Yet, 
at this time, the United States was experiencing a transition from an 
isolationist, provincial nation to a world power with far-flung commit-
ments and obligations. It might have been Funston's seeming irresponsi-
bility rather than his alleged immorality which moved his critics to ·de-
nounce his capture of Emilio Aguinaldo. Somehow, his behavior ·seemed 
inconsistent with the nation's new role in international affairs. The 
United States was emerging from its adolescence and Funston's antics 
might-have seemed somewhat juvenile. However, the rationale of the 
young general's detractors is not the -issue here. The ·concern of this 
study is Funston's stature as a military leader. The perception of the 
·masses is not always precise; romantic episodes and colorful person-
alities appeal to the.public, obscuring more fundamental factors. Hence, 
in 1917, the press speculated that Funston might have·been- sent to 
iii 
France in command of the American Expeditionary Force. The subsequent 
chapters will attempt to determine what justification there was for t..he 
confidence placed by many Americans in their controversial hero. 
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Dr o O o A. Hilton, 
whose patience and guidance were so vital in completing this study; to 
Dr. Sidney D. Brovm and Dr. Ieroy H. Fischer for their advice: and assis-
tance; and to Dr. Guy Renfro Donnell for material from the National 
Archives which he so graciously supplied to me. For her tire,less efforts 
in rrry behalf 9 I wish to extend my appreciation. to Mrs. Alice Pattee of the 
Library Staff at Oklahoma State University. Also, I wish to thank the 
staff of the Kansas Historical Society in Tbpeka for their splendid co-
operation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Frederick Funston was born in Ohio on November 5, 1865, and while 
still in his infancy his family moved to Kansas and settled at the town 
of Iola. Frederick's father, Edward Hogue Funston, was a man of some 
education, and he held a prominent place in the public life of his 
adopted state for a quarter of a century.l He served in both houses 
of the state legislature and from 1884 to 1894 he sat in the United 
States Congress as representative at large from Kansas. "Foghorn" 
Funston, as the congressman was known, was a man of imposing stature 
in contrast to his diminutive son. He was also a strict, high-tariff 
Republican. 2 
Frederick completed his elementary education in a local school, 
and then entered the·regional secondary school. Failing to obtain an 
appointment to West Point because he·could not meet the requirements 
in height and scholarship, he enrolled in the state university at 
Lawrence. He was dependent upon his own resources during his college 
career; he worked as a guide for ·campus visitors to meet his expenses. 
Among the young men attending the university at this time was William 
Allen White, destined to win nation-wide recognition and acclaim as a 
1charles F. Scott, "Frederick Funston," The Independent, LIII 
(April 11, 1901), 817. 
2James H. Canfield, "Funston: A Kansas Product," American Review 
of Reviews, XXIII (May, 1901), 578. 
1 
journalist. White described Frederick as a "pudgy, apple-cheeked", 
youth who stood just under five feet and five inches in height.3 He 
2 
attributed Funston's habitual clowning to an instinctive desire to over-
come his small size by laughing at himself. Funston was not particularly 
dexterous and he did not participate in any form of athletics. 4 He was 
rather clumsy and walked swiftly but not too steadily. However, nothing 
seemed to frighten him and in his youthful exploits he was something 
of a dare-devil. In his academic endeavors, he was a poor to passable 
student in White's opinion, but his classroom performance was not an 
adequate criterion with which to measure his intellectual capacities, 
According to a faculty member of the history department, he was an om-
nivorous reader and soon exhausted the resources of the university 
library. 5 He read widely in the fields of history, political science, 
and sociology, but only as a diversion and not as a task. In the class-
room his economics professor found him attentive, alert,and always ready 
to participate in discussion, but he never monopolized the conversation 
and was a good listener. 6 Young Frederick appeared to master fundamental 
principles easily, but had a tendency to neglect details when applying 
these precepts. Although he would cling tenaciously to his generally 
well formed opinions, he was always amenable to rational argument. 
In his personal habits he was methodical and meticulous. He loved 
3william Allen White, Autobiography (New York, The Macmillan 
Company, 1946), 142. 
4Ibid. 
5canfield, "Funston: A Kansas Product," 578. 
6Ibid. 
3 
good clothes which he could not afford to buy. 7 Although he retained 
a certain boyish quality, he was reasonably mature despite his restless 
and uneasy temperament. His affectionate nature endeared him to his 
fellow students and especially to his fraternity brothers, among whom 
Vernon Kellogg and White were his closest friends. Kellogg assumed a 
tolerant and protective ·attitude toward the other two members of the 
trio; all of them had adventurous spirits and could express themselves 
beautifully in the written word. 8 Funston made his top grades in 
English composition and had a good sense of humor and a sharp wit, which 
he later displayed in his war memoirs.9 While at Lawrence, Funston 
formed life-long friendships with men who were destined to achieve fame 
and renown in their respective vocations, and he was given a nickname 
which proved to be just as lasting as his friendships. Funston was 
spelled "Timson" in the national journal of Phi Delta Theta, and he was 
promptly dubbed "Timmy". 
Funston left college after his sophomore year, partly for financial 
reasons, partly because he -chafed under the uninteresting burdens ~f 
10 
academic life. He was convinced that his future was in journalism 
and he accepted a position with the Fort Smith (Arkansas) Tribune as 
police reporter. The Tribune was, at that time, a leading Democratic 
organ in Arkansas. One day the editor left Funston in charge with 
catastrophic results. In the following morning's edition, the young 
7White, Autobiography, 142. 
8Ibid., 143. 
9Frederick Funston, Memories of Two Wars (New York, Charles 
Scribners Sons, 1911). 
10scott , "Frederick Funston," 818. 
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Kansan published a stinging denunciation of the Democratic party in 
general and the politicos of Fort Smith and Pulaski county in particu-
lar. For this he was immediately dismissed.11 
Unable to find another newspaper job, Funston worked as a ticket 
collector on the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad. In the summer 
of 1890, Frederick's father, at that time Chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Agriculture, secured for him a position with a party of bota-
nists whose mission was the collection of wild grasses in Montana. He 
discharged his duties so well that he was given a similar assignment 
the following year with an expedition to the Death Valley region in 
California. Of the group of hardened men who made this trip, more than 
half were disabled in body or mind by the terrible hardships they were 
forced to endure.12 Funston did not sustain any .permanent physical or 
mental injury, despite the fact that he walked many miles without food 
or water in desert heat of 140 degrees to obtain aid for .his com-
13 
panions. 
Funston' s career with the De.partment of Agriculture culminated 
with his widely publicized journey into the unexplored wilds of Alaska. 
He had previously spent a summer with the Indians on the coast, but on 
this venture, he was alone, by choice, and he .had to endure an Arctic 
winter. Funston was entrusted with this hazardous mission because his 
superiors considered him to be the ·One most likely to complete the ·expe-
dition successfully. After 18 months of exile and thousands of miles 
llibid., 818. 
12Ibid., 818. 
13Ibid., 818. 
5 
of travel across largely uncharted country, Funston returned with his 
botanical samples and his report on the .plant life of the region. 
Funston resigned his position with the Department of Agriculture 
and occupied himself during the winter of 1894-1895 by giving lectures 
on his experiences . Lecturing was remunerative but it was also boring, 
and so the summer of 1895 found him in Central America where he became 
interested in the coffee -growing business. Charles S. Gleed, an alumnus 
of Kansas University, had staked him for a share in a coffee plantation.14 
The -project failed and Funston and some of his friends in Lawrence saw 
their investments dissipated. 15 Funston worked for a time as police 
reporter for the Kansas City Journal, enjoying a brief reunion with 
White who was also employed by that newspaper. Together they roamed 
the streets of what was to them a big city, reliving old times and con-
versing far into the night about their past adventures and speculating 
over future developments. 
In the summer of 1896, Funston was in New York, dabbling in 
journalism, when he happened to visit the Cuban Fair in progress in 
Madison Square Garden. The fair was supported by resident Cubans and 
Americans who sympathized with the Cuban independence movement. Os-
tensibly, the purpose of the festival was to raise funds for medical 
supplies for the insurgents, but Funston later -reflected that there was 
more traffic in guns resulting from the affair than there was in medi-
cine.16 A speech by a retired Civil War -general, Daniel E. Sickles, 
14 White, Autobiography, 210. 
15 
Ibid., 306. 
16Funston, Memories of Two Wars, 3. 
6 
aroused Funston and he .promptly offered his services to the .Cuban junta. 
He was politely informed by a.n official of the independence movement 
that no Americans were being sent to fight the Spanish. However, when 
he returned with a letter of introduction from Sickles he was welcomed 
into the insurgent fold. Since Spanish agents abounded in New York, 
the junta was forced to take security measures, and Funston's bold ap-
proach was naturally regarded with some suspicion. 
His first duty was to learn something about the operation and 
maintenance of artillery. For this purpose he was sent to a local arms 
dealer where he received rudimentary training in the handling of a 12 
pound Hotchkiss breech-loading rifle. He memorized the statistics on 
range and velocity and , after a few nights of idleness, he was called 
upon to instruct a group of Cuban youths in the mechanics of artillery 
pieces. 17 These classes continued for a month before a long anticipated 
call came; Funston was directed to proceed to Cuba. After travelling by 
rail to Charleston, South Carolina:; . he boarded the Dauntless, a well 
known blockade runner which smu.ggled arms and volunteers into the island. 
In August, 1896, Funston joined the insurrectionists under General Gomez 
with the ·rank of Captain of artillery. In the beginning the Cubans had 
nothing worthy of the name, but after 18 months of service, Funston, now 
as a Lieutenant Colonel, the highest rank attained by any American in 
the insurgent army, commanded a respectable array of field pieces, in-
cluding a "dynamite gun" which threw an explosive gelatin charge with 
terrific consequences. Funston used his guns against Spanish fortifi-
cations at incredibly close ranges; at times he was only a few hundred 
yards from the enemy and well within the ·reach of the Spanish Mausers. 
17Ibid, 7. 
7 
The fearle-ss Kansan did not survive the long ordeal unscathed. His 
left ann was broken by a Mauser bullet and another bullet penetrated 
both lungs, forcing him to spend three months in a primitive jungle 
hospita1.l8 While in the hospital he -contracted Typhoid fever. Finally 
he suffered from an obstinate abscess which resulted when he fell from 
his horse. Facing a complete physical collapse, Funston obtained per-
mission from General Maximo Gomez to leave the island.19 The precarious 
condition of his health was perhaps not the -only reason for his de-
parture. Funston had been incensed and outraged by the execution of 
Spanish prisoners by the insurgents and had protested to the Cuban 
commanders. Ironically, a few years later Funston himself would be the 
target of similar charges. He was also accused of desertion and it was 
alleged that the insurgents considered him a traitor who had defected 
to the Spanish. 20 Funston denied this, claiming that he enjoyed the 
respect of the -military leaders of the insurrection as evidenced by his 
hearty reception at a sumptuous banquet given in his honor in 1906. 21 
The occasion referred to was Funston's visit to the island in his capa-
city as mediator in the civil war that had broken out between rival 
Cuban factions. He .attributed any animosity on the .part of the Cubans 
to the friction between the military and civil leaders of the insur-
rection. General Gomez had sanctioned his departure but the civil 
lBscott, "Frederick Funston," 820. 
19New York Times, October 19, 1906, p. 7 . 
20Testimony of John F. Hall, presented as evidence before Senate 
investigating committee on Philippine affairs, 57th Congress, 2nd Session, 
Senate Document 2, part 2, 1445. 
21New York~' October 19, 1906, p. 7. 
8 
authorities refused him passage on a ship which they surreptitiously 
operated during the Spanish blockade. Undaunted by this turn of fortune, 
Funston attempted to slip through the enemy lines, but he was captured 
and hastily devoured an incriminating document which would have placed 
him before a firing squad. He then represented himself as a deserter 
and the Spanish allowed him to return to the United States. 22 
When he reached New York, Funston secured the medical attention 
necessary to prevent any further deterioration of his health and then 
proceeded to his home in Kansas for a period of rest and recuperation. 
He enjoyed the company of family and friends and did his best to forget 
the horror of the Cuban campaign. 23 The Maine had already been blown 
up and the country was filled with rumors of war. Funston doubted that 
the United States would become involved in a conflict with Spain, and 
he blamed the "Yellow Press" and the politicians for inflaming public 
sentiment.24 When war did come, he -entertained little hope of partici-
pating, for, as he expressed it: "I was without friends or acquaintances 
among those high in official life in Washington and took it for granted 
that in filling the quota of my own state the governor thereof would 
utilize as far as possible the ~xisting organizations of the national 
guard, of which I was not a member. 11 25 
Fatefully, however, Governor John W. Leedy held office by ·virtue 
of a Populist wave which had swept across Kansas, and he regarded the 
22Ibid., 7. 
23Funston, Memories of Two Wars, 149. 
24Ibid., 149. 
25rbid., 149-150. 
regular army and the national guard with distrust. When the president 
issued a call for volunteers, Kansas was asked to furnish three regi-
9 
ments of a thousand men each. The governor, upon receiving this request, 
innnediately sought a meeting with Funston, whom he had met previously in 
an informal visit. When Funston arrived, Leedy informed him that he in-
tended to ignore the national guard and form his own regiments. Members 
of the guard could enter one of these units, but only as individuals.26 
The governor offered Funston the conmand of one of the new regiments. 
Knowing little about the training of troops, Funston was reluctant to 
accept the comnission. He protested thatin the interests of the order 
and efficiency in the prosecution of the war the -existing units of the 
national guard should remain intact. Leedy was adamant and informed him 
that he was in no ,need of free advice; if Funston 'did not want to command a 
regiment, he would offer the commission to another. Funston rational,:.. 
ized ;that he ·could do no worse than the governor's alternate candidate so 
he ·submitted and was appointed a Colonel of Volunteers.27 
Colonel Funston's regiment moved to San Francisco but he .was de-
tained for a time in Florida, where his knowledge of Cuban conditions 
placed him in an advisory capacity in the headquarters of General William 
R. Shafter. However, he was soon on his way to join his command, and, 
in November, 1898, the regiment was sent to the Philippine Islands. 
There the Twentieth Kansas served in the brigade of General Harrison 
Gray Otis under the division command of General Arthur MacArthur. The 
war with Spain was over, but Funston and his men covered themselves 
26rbid., 150. 
27rbid., 151. 
10 
with glory in the ensuing conflict between the Filipinos and the United 
States forces. The colonel seemed to possess a magnetic and dynamic 
quality which enabled him to lead volunteers ·into the fiercest fire and 
the most tangled jungle·s and swamps. On April 27, 1899, Funston and a 
party of a bout SO men cros·sed the Rio Grande river in central Luzon in 
the face of a rain of insurgent ·bullets. Upon reaching the opposite 
shore, this handful of soldiers routed far superior numbers of Filipinos 
and enabled the American forces to carry the field, driving the enemy 
from their entrenchments before the town of Calumpit. 28 For this -display 
of gallantry, Funston was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor and 
was promoted to Brigadier General of Volunteers.29 
After the expiration of his term of enlistment, Funston returned 
home and received many offers from business interests which would pro-
·vide him a salary twice what he was earning as an army officer. For a 
.series of SO lectures he was promised compensation equal to five years' 
wages as a brigadier generai. 30 There were other considerations which 
argued against his return to the Philippines. Funston had met Eda 
Blankart while in San Francisco, and she had become his bride. Funston 
no longer was responsible only for himself. Mrs. Funston's health 
would not allow -her to live in the Philippines and, indeed, the ·general's 
physical condition was not sound enough to warrant another term in the 
t . 31 rop1cs. Funston also recognized that the glamorous period of the 
insurrection, if such an euphemism could be applied . to. the early 
28}\_n_o!!•, "He Snared Aguinaldo," Literary Digest, LIV (March 10, 
1917), 644. 
29Ibid., 644. 
30scott, "Frederick Funston," 820. 
31Ibid., 820. 
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months of the war, was .past, and that the distasteful, unappealing task 
of suppressing the guerrilla forces of Aguinaldo would be his duty if 
he re-enlisted. Yet, Funston elected to rejoin his command in Luzon 
and this fateful decision opened the way to a career in the regular army 
and to achievements which would capture the public imagination as had 
none of his previous exploits. 
CHAPTER II 
THE CAPTURE OF AGUINALDO 
Early in 1901, Funston electrified the nation by capturing the 
Filipino president, Emilio Aguinaldo. This feat was of great siginfi-
cance in several respects. First of all, most of the .army conunand con-· 
sidered that the seizure of the little chieftain broke the back of 
insurgent resistance in Luzon. Many Filipinos had considered Aguinaldo 
invincible and as long as he eluded the Americans who pursued him, 
their will to fight was sustained. In the second place, his capture 
of the insurgent leader prompted his promotion to brigadier general 
in the ·regular army and launched him in a profession in which his am-
bition and energy were directed toward more valuable ends than his 
former quest for excitement and action. Also, this particular ac-
complishment was undoubtedly the highlight of his career in terms of 
public recognition. Some observers pointed to the .popular acclamation 
of Funston for -his strategem as indicative of the morality of the Ameri-
can masses. Funston was seen by anti-imperialists as typifying the 
amoral attitude of Americans toward less developed societies. Lastly, 
the -capture of Aguinaldo was an achievement which can be -credited al-
most entirely to Funston. He ·conceived the -plan of action, convinced 
his superiors of its feasibility, and carried it out personally. 
Scattered throughout the Philippines were 70,000 American troops, 
including native auxiliaries. The detachments ranged in size from a 
regiment to a company and these units garrisoned every town of importance 
12 
13 
1 
in the islands. The ,war between the Philippine nationalists and the 
United States which had broken out in February, 1899, had now degener-
ated into a vicious guerrilla conflict. The Americans had crushed the 
insurgent armies in the field but found it more ,difficult to break the 
indomitable will of the Filipinos. Short of arms and anununition, the 
·native forces could not approach the fire-power .of the American anny. 
The avera-ge insurgent was fortunate to . possess a rifle, and even then he 
was likely to be using defective cartridges which had been reloaded in-
numerable times. Filipino casualties ran very high and their ratio of 
five deaths to every man wounded hinted at the nature of the strife. 2 
Indeed, many American officers fe.lt that the insurgents had forfeited 
the rights and privileges of "civilized warfare" by their use of ir-
regular bands and hit and run tactics. 
These partisan forces, however, represented the Philippine in-
surrectionist gover~nt and owed allegiance to General Emilio Aguinaldo, 
President of the Republic that was hopefully established after the .de-
feat of the Spanish. Covertly, this government still existed in the 
fonn of underground organizations in most of the towns which were 
nominally under American jurisdiction. Often the same official acted 
as agent for both governments. The guerrilla forces received both 
material support, in the form of food, clothing and equipment, and moral 
sanction from the Filipinos. The bulk of the .native .population, both 
educated and ignorant, considered the Americans usurpers and regarded 
!Frederick Funston, "The Capture of Aguinaldo," Scribners, L 
(November, 1911), 523. 
2Emilio Aguinaldo, with Vicente Albano Pacis, ! Second Look At 
America (New York, Robert Speller and Sons, Publishers Inc., 1957), 17. 
14 
any 0f their countrymen who collaborated with the foreign invaders as 
traitors. 3 Any leader who surrendered to the United States Anny was 
thereafter suspect, no matter .how much subsequent dmible-dealing he 
engaged in to regain his stature. Many perceptive Americans realized 
that the "insurrection" was actually ·a .popular movement for inde.pendence 
in which the enemy was not a group of insurgents but a united people. 
It was only with great reluctance that Aguinaldo and his chieftains 
pursued the war .against the United States. The Philippine leader -enter-
tained little hope of defeating the Americans but rather sought by firm 
resistance to demonstrate Filipino determinati0n to gain independence. 
Perhaps the Americans would recognize the fact that his people did not 
wish to be civilized at the expense of their national sovereignty. 
Militarily, the prospects were bleak; the Americans fought with a re-
sourcefulness and daring never exhibited by the Spanish who were des-
cribed by Aguinaldo as "leisurely and slow" fighters. 4 The United States 
poured in reinforcements and equipment in amazing quantities. Against 
such formidable opposition the Filipino had only vague .hopes of outside 
intervention to save them from complete subjugation. Aguinaldo placed 
great faith in the Democratic party ·and the Anti-Imperialist League to 
generate -enough pressure in the United States to force the government 
to withdraw from the Philippines. All else failing, the insurgents 
looked to Europe for aid. For a price, they reasoned, one of the Euro-
pean powers , perhaps Germany, could be enticed into the conflict with 
3James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines (New 
York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912), 334. 
4Aguinaldo, A Second 10ok At America, 115. 
15 
h A . 5 t e mer1cans. 
The United States Army had its own remedy for the Philippine situ-
ation. It consisted of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion by em-· 
ploying as much in the way of additional men and materials as necessary. 
Of course the practical Americans would not demur if a panacea was de-
vised which would end the conflict in one blow. To many officers the 
capture of the insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, seemed the solution to the 
problem of how to break the Filipino resistance. Since November, 1899, 
when the Filipino military leaders decided that further -organized re-
sistence was impossible and disbanded their field anny, 6 the one great 
desire of the army was Aguinaldo's demise, violent or otherwise. It was 
generally felt that the little president was the driving force behind the 
resistance movement and that he personally represented the ·cohe-si ve -ele-
ment which bound the insurgents and coordinated their efforts. 
In February, 1901, Colonel Frederick Funston, United States Volun-
teers, commanding the Fourth District of the Department of Northern 
Luzon, was presented with an opportunity to achieve ·military fame and 
popular -renown. At his headquarters in San Isidr-o he received word 
that the officer cornmanding the station at Pantabangan, about sixty 
miles to the northeast, was holding a native messenger named Cecilio 
Sigismundo. Sigismundo had been persuaded to surrender to the Ameri-
cans by the local mayor who, to the ·messenger's surprise, was cooper-
ating with the Americans in fact as well as name. According to Funston's 
5Ibid., 115. 
6Annual report of Major General Arthur MacArthur ·to the Secretary 
of War, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., House Document 2, part 2, 88. 
16 
7 
report, the ·courier then turned over to the conunanding officer a packet 
of letters from Aguinaldo to various chieftains throughout central Luzon. 
Urbano Lacuna, insurgent leader in Neuva Ecija province where the courier 
was apprehended, was to receive the letters and forward them to their ·re-
spective destinations.8 
Funston immediately replied to the officer at Pantagangan, re-
questing that the courier and the letters be brought at once to San Isidro. 
When they arrived, Funston found that the letters bore no addresses and 
were signed in various~ de guerres. Also, many of the dispatches 
were in code and were deciphered only with great difficulty by Lazaro 
Segovia, a Spaniard of dubious integrity who was currently in American 
employ. It was learned that Emilio Aguinaldo had ordered his cousin, 
Baldomero Aguinaldo, to assume command of central Luzon, replacing Jose 
Alejandrino with whom the president was presumably displeased because of 
his inept prosecution of the war. Then Baldomero was to select four-
hundred armed men from the ·various bands and dispatch them to Emilio. 
The location of the .president's retreat was volunteered by the ·courier, 
Sigismundo, whom Aguinaldo had ordered to guide the first detachment 
of the anticipated reinforcements. For more than a year ·the exact where-
a-bouts of Aguinaldo had been a mystery. Probably few, if any, of the 
provincial chieftains knew his location. 9 Since only a few trusted men 
were aware of his hideout, Sigismundo must have been regarded as a man 
7Report of Funston to Major General Loyd Wheaton, commanding Depart-
ment of Northern Luzon, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., House Document 2, part 3, 
122. Hereafter referred to as Funston's Report. 
8Funston, "The Capture of Aguinaldo," 523. 
9Ibid., 524. 
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of exceptional integrity. Yet he apjiarently deserted to the Americarls 
and freely revealed all that ne knew concerning ~is mqster. 
The contradiction here is obvious and funston's account loses its 
credibility when one examines a recent desc~ipt'ion of -the same episode 
by Emilio Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo compared nq~es with other insurgent_ 
leaders after the war and pieced together an entirely different story 
of Sigismundo's "betrayal". 
The Americans had prac'ticed various tortures on captur:ed in-
surgents to obtain just such information a~ Sigismundo revealed. 
Periodical literature and newspapers of the ,day carried · to the Ameri-
can readers accounts of United States army brut~lity. Especially publi-
cized was the "water cure", (a cure for reticence), 10 in which a bamboo 
reed was forced into the victim's mouth and gallon after gallon of 
water was poured in, crowding the internal organs and producing a very 
. ' 
painful distention of the stomach. The pressure would be then released 
. . ,' 
by natural processes or, if the tormentors were impatient, one would 
jump on the prostrate man's abdomen. Rarely coul~ one subjected to 
this form of torture withstand over one or two treatments without dis-
closing the desired information to avoid another dose. 
In Aguinaldo's version, Funston personally was responsible for the 
torture of Sigismundo and his companions i!l an a~tempt to force them to 
divulge information about their mission. The messages entrusted to 
Sigismundo had been concealed in the woods and the Americans obtained 
them. only after he had been subjected to two applications of the 
.:, . . 
"water cure". Then, according to Aguinaldo, he led his captors to the 
packet of letters. If this last statement is to be taken literally, 
lOBlount , The American Occu~ation .2f the Philippines, 202n. 
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it appears unlikely that Funston himself presided over the interrogation 
of the courier, for his headquarters was sixty miles from ·the scene of 
Sigismundo's "surrender". Certainly he was responsible, however, for 
impressing Sigismundo into -service against his president, for when the 
decoded letters revealed that the messenger knew the site of Aguinaldo's 
headquarters, Funston concocted a plan to capture ·the insurgent chief by 
using the unfortunate Sigismundo as a decoy.11 
Funston's scheme .hinged on the fact that Sigismundo was supposed to 
lead the first -group of reinforcements to Palanan, where Aguinalde was 
hiding. He proposed to disguise a company of native mercenaries called 
Macabebes as insurgents, and enlist the aid of a few ex-insurgents to 
"command" the party. Funston and four or five American officers would 
accompany them as "prisoners of war", although they would actually -be 
in command of the ~xpedition. Under the circumstances this bit of 
subterfuge seemed the only way to reach Agu.inaldo, ,for the natives 
would warn the Filipino president before a punitive force could get 
near the town. 
Palanan was a little village of bamboo huts in the province of 
Isabela in northeastern Luzon. It was completely isolated from the out-
side world except for rough trails through the tangled jungle. The 
inhabitants knew little of the war when Aguinaldo arrived in September 
of 1900. Yet they enthusiastically welcomed him and gave him unquali-
12 fied support. Here Aguinald0 ana his small party of officers and 
llFunston's Report, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., ~ Document 2, part 
3, 123. 
12Emilio Aguinaldo, "The Story of My Capture," Everybody's Magazine, 
V {August, 1901), 131. 
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soldiers were unmolested until Funston' s raid in late March, 1901. Once 
a detachment of Americans wandered into Palanan but Aguinaldo and his 
men, forewarned, hid until they departed. 13 Had it not been for the 
impatience of Colonel Simon Villa, Auginaldo's chief of staff, the 
Funston episode might have been avoided. Villa chafed at the placid, 
uneventful existence in Palanan and requested a conunand in the field. 
The .president conferred with the treasurer of the Philippine Republic, 
Dr. Santiago Barcelona, and decided to requisition the conunanding offi-
cer in central Luzon £or four-hundred men who would be placed under 
Villa' s command.14 
The insurgent chief in central Luzon would then direct each of his 
four zone commanders to contribute a band of select men. Urbano Lacuna 
was one of the zone commanders and i t was his detachment which was im-
personated by Funston and his Macabebes. 
The Macabebes were indistinguishable from t he native s tocks but 
they spoke their own peculiar dialect. They were ,presumably descen-
dant s of Indians brought by the Spanish from North America who were 
allowed to sett l e near Mani la Bay i n t he province of Pampanga upon 
1 . f th . ·1 ·t . ·15 comp et1:on o e1r m1 1 ary service. Though these warriors i nter-
married t hrough succeeding generations, they continued to look to the 
colonial Spanish government for assistance and protection. They in 
turn served as mercenaries for their white masters and automatically 
transferred their l oyalty to the Americans to protect themselves f rom 
13Ibid. , 132. 
14Ibid ·-, 134. 
15w. Cameron Forbes , The Philippines Islands (2 vol s. , Bos ton, 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), I, 103n. 
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the wrath of the Filipinos. 
Funston selected eighty-one Macabebes who spoke the Tagalo dialect 
of the central Luzon insurgents and who were strong enough for the 
grueling expedition and intelligent enough to carry out the subterfuge. 
In addition he recruited four turncoat insurgents to complete· the rtise 
by portraying the .officers in corrunand. Hilario Tal Placido, "chief" 
of the band, was personally acquainted with Aguinaldo. Lazaro Segovia 
was of pure Spanish blood and a sergeant in the colonial army before 
he deserted to the insurgents, where he held the rank of lieutenant. 
Dionisio Bato and Gregario Cadhit were also ex-Filipino lieutenants. 
The three Tagalos were described by Aguinaldo as "plain renegades" 
who had been repeatedly disciplined by their superiors for various 
military offenses while in the Filipino army. 16 Apparently they sought 
revenge as well as American gold. As it turned out, Funston picked his 
men well, which, of course, proved nothing except that he had an excel-
lent taste for renegades. 
All who participated in the venture were offered sizable rewards, 
contingent on the success of the undertaking. They were also promised 
quick and effective punishment, presumably death, for .failure to fulfil 
their duties. With the exception of Segovia and the hapless Sigismundo, 
none was informed of the nature of the expedition until after departure. 
Funston obviously feared treachery on the part of the Tagalos. The 
only security risk involved with the Macabebes was the danger of one 
of them revealing the plot while in his cups. 17 
16Aguinaldo, ! Second Look at America, 124. 
l7B1ount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, 335. 
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To play the role of prisoners of war and to provide the actual 
leadership of the party, Funston selected Captain Harry F. Newton, 
Thirty-fourth Infantry, United States Volunteers, and First Lieutenant 
B. J. Mitchell, Fortieth Infantry, United States Volunteers, in ad-
dition to the officers attached t o the Macabebe company. The latter 
were brothers; Captain R. T. Hazzard and O. P. M. Hazzard, Eleventh 
Cavalry, United States Volunteers. 
Division Commander Major General Arthur MacArthur had approved 
Funston's plan and had arranged with the navy to transport the detach-
ment by sea to Casiguran Bay, about ninety miles south of Palanan on 
the east coast of Luzon. 
On March 6, 1901, the command boarded the gunboat Vicksburg in 
Manila and began the voyage around the southern end of Luzon through 
the San Bernardino Straits. Once aboard the men discarded their Ameri-
can uniforms and donned a non-descript collection of native clothing, 
including some tattered insurgent uniforms. The American officers put 
on private's uniforms that were equally shabby. The natives in the 
party were armed with Spanish Mausers and Remingtons, with ten Krag 
Jorgensen -rifles representing the arms captured from the American pa-
trol from which the five .prisoners supposedly were taken. 
Funston undoubtedly possessed courage and perserverance for there 
was little to justify his optimism concerning the expedition. MacArthur 
cautioned him that it was a hazardous operation and expressed the fear 
that he would never again see Funston alive. 18 There we-re others who 
considered the mission a dangerous one and for good reason. The 
l BFunston, "The Capture of Aguinaldo," 528. 
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chances were great that the party would meet an insurgent force that 
far outnumbered them. In the region in which they were to penetrate 
there would be no support from American units or outposts; they would 
be left entirely to their own resources. Probably most depressing to 
Funston, however, was the -news that he was being nmstered out of the 
service, since he was a volunteer officer, and that he .had received 
only a temporary extension to allow him to complete his ffspecial duty". 
By March 12, 1901, the Vicksburg had rounded the southern tip of 
Luzon and proceeded up the east coast as far as the Polillo Islands. 
Here Funston finally succeeded in securing native ships, two-masted 
craft called bancas, which he .planned to use for disembarking the 
troops. If possible, Funston wished to ·avoid bringing the gunboat 
within sight of the shore and he knew the bancas would arouse no sus-
picion. However, the Vicksburg soon encountered a storm and the native 
ships, which were being towed, were swamped and the party was forced to 
continue without them. Funston now resigned himself to the fact that 
the Vicksburg's boats would have to be used in landing his command. 
On some stationery captured previously from Urbano Lacuna's head-
quarters, Segovia, on Funston's instructions, now wrote two letters to 
Aguinaldo. The first, dated February 24, was Lacuna's acknowledgment 
to Aguinaldo's message to him, and the second stated that Lacuna had 
received orders from the commander of central Luzon to dispatch one of 
his best companies to Aguinaldo. This force was commanded by Hilario 
Tal Placido, according to the letter, and Tal Placido was once again 
working with the Filipinos after a brief period of inactivity .following 
his pledge of allegiance to the United States. 19 This statement was 
19Funston's Report, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., House Dqcument 2, part 
3, 125. 
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inserted because it was .feared that Aguinaldo had heard of Tal Placido's 
defection. The -rest of the officers were also mentioned including 
Segovia, "who had shown himself so much addicted to our causen.20 
With the completion of the fake letters, the conunand was prepared 
for the landing. On March 13, at 9 P.M. the Vicksburg, under a low 
head of steam and with all lights screened, entered Casiguran Bay and 
at 1 A.M. anchored near the west shore. The boats were lowered and 
within an hour all had disembarked. The night was ideal for cover but 
little else as it was extremely dark, with occasional rain squalls. 
Before the Vicksburg's departure, arrangements were made for the gunboat 
to visit Casiguran four days hence on the pretext of searching for some 
American prisoners. This would not only add credence to their story, 
but would also provide an exit · in case the ruse failed. The final 
rendesvouz with the Vicksburg was set for the Twenty-fifth -in Palanan 
21 Bay. This, of course, was de.pendent upon the success of the mission. 
The -company remained on the beach until daylight, when they located 
fresh water and prepared breakfast. Then the command started for the 
village of Casiguran, which was only a few miles distant across country 
but the difficult terrain made the trip a torturous twenty mile march. 
At noon a native boat was discovered and it was used to send word of 
their arrival to the townspeople. Food and quarters were requested and 
they were readily provided by the local vice-presidente. By evening 
all the conunand was established in Casigura.n. The American prisoners 
were treated well, although they were the subjects of much curiosity. 
They were fed the local staples-cracked corn, sweet potatoes, and a 
21 Funston's Report, 57th Cong •. , 1st Sess-.-, House Document 2, part 
3, 125. 
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few chickens. Three nights were spent in Casiguran during which Funston 
directed the proceedings through Segovia, with whom he had periodic 
surreptitious conferences. The fate of the whole command was thus en-
trusted to a proven double-dealer, but one must wonder most at the 
audacity of Funston than at Segovia's loyalty, for the latter was prob-
ably strongly motivated by the prospect of nn1ch American gold with the 
successful conclusion of the mission. Still Funston admired and re-
sp:ected him and considering the results of the venture; his judgment of 
men could scarcely be impugned. Certainly Segovia's combination of 
intelligence and resourcefulness with a fine .command of the Tagalo dia-:-
lect and knowledge of the Filipino temperament made .him indispensable-. 
While at Casiguran, the Macabebes were informed by the villagers 
that Aguinaldo had just been reinforced by a band of four-hundred armed 
men. They immediately panicked but Funston succeeded in ca1ming them 
through individual contacts made during the night. The element of sur-
prise, Funston told them, would offset the ·terrific odds. 22 
A third letter was now prepared for Aguinaldo, this one presum-
ably from Tal Placido, the Tagalo in "command" of Funston's party. 
In the letter, which of course was composed by Funston, Tal Placido 
informed the Filipino president that he was enroute to Palanan with 
a force which Lacuna had directed him to take to Aguinaldo's .hideout. 
This letter, together with the two previously -wri tte-n deceptions, was 
carried to Palanan by native messengers who arrived at their destination 
two days ahead of the ·column. These cleverly devised frauds, as it 
turned out, completely disarmed Aguinaldo, and proved to be ·the crucial 
22Ibid., 126. 
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factor in his capture. 
Much to their disappointment, the Americans discovered that the 
village staples were useless for provisioning a five day jeurney, for 
the natives subsisted primarily on fresh ,fish and sweet potatoes. The 
local official offered to scour the area for corn in sufficient quanti--
ties but the Vicksburg would be in Palanan Bay, ninety miles to the 
north, in eight days. Therefore; the party left Casiguran on the morning 
of March 17 with rations adequate for only half the . journey. Despite 
efforts to conserve the food, the men went hungry - during most of the 
march to Palanan. What bits of edible ·material they could gather on 
the way only sharpened their hunger. Besides the foed problem, the 
party had to contend with the elements and the -almost impassable terrain. 
The .heavens opened in a deluge which soaked them to the skin and impeded 
their progress. At 6 P.M. on March 22, the column reached the point 
where the trail to Palanan left the coast and proceeded inland. Here 
they found some natives building sheds to house the American prisoners 
as Aguinaldo did not wish to have them brought to his headquarters for 
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security reasons. The ·insurgent chief planned to conduct the captives 
to Ilagan under the cover of darkness and release them.24 
The column was now within eight miles of their destination but 
twenty of the Macabebes were so weakened by hunger that they could not 
continue without nourishment. Practical as always-, Funston dictated 
to Segovia a note to Aguinaldo which affirmed compliance with the in-
structions concerning the prisoners, and requested provisions for the 
23Ibid., 127. 
24Aguinalde, "The Story of My Capture," 134. 
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starving men. The following morning the insurgents delivered enough 
cracked corn to enable the men to resume the march. 
Aguinaldo's stipulation that the Americans should not be brought 
to Palanan threatened to sabotage the mission as far as Funston was 
concerned. Whether the presence of the American officers was necessary 
for the execution of the coup is problematic. Perhaps the insurgent 
leaders would have been dealt with more severely ·if l eft to the tender 
mercies o{ the Macabebes, but Funston was probably also moved by the 
des i re t o \e on stage when the cur t a i n opened. Accordingly, the 
colonel 's fertile brain concocted a scheme to avoid this new obstacle. 
The main column continued on for Pal ana~, leaving the Americans and 
ten Macabebe " guards" at the make- shift .pri son. However, within an 
hour a Macabebe corporal returned with new instructions which ordered 
the guards to bring their wards to Aguinaldo. This satisfied t he na-
tives who had built the sheds for the prisoners and the Americans de-
parted without incident. 
About half way to Palanan, Funston and his companions met two 
Macabebes who .had returned to inform them that Aguinaldo had dis-
patched his own guard to watch the prisoners in order that the entire 
command could pr oceed t o his headquarters . In . o~der · t o· ·Wamt"-tfi'uns ton 
Segovia had . detainea the i nsurgents ·when:he·· learned that they were · to 
relieve the Macabebes .. The colonel and his men hid along the trail 
in dense thi ckets , allowed the r elief squad to pass, and then resumed 
their march.25 Funston all owed time for the rest of the column to 
cross the Palanan River 'before putting i n his appearance, fearing that 
25 Funston ' s Report, 57th Cong., 1st Sess • ., House Document 2, .part 
3, 128 . 
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if the Americans were sighted before the Macabebes were in position, 
the Filipino leaders would escape. The presence ef the American 
prisoners after Aguinaldo had specified that they should not be brought 
to Palanan might have exposed the plot. 
At a few minutes before 3 P.M., March 23, the officers reached 
the Palanan River, and across a hundred yard expanse of water they saw 
Aguinaldo's retreat. The last load of Macabebes had crossed and, in 
accordance with _previous arrangements, the ·boat was sent back for the 
Americans. Segovia and Tal Placido .had entered Aguinaldo's quarters 
and were distracting the insurgent leaders with conversation which 
bordered on the inane. One after another, four of Aguinaldo's staff 
left the room for various reasons, leaving Dr. Santiago Barcelona, 
Treasurer of the Republic, Colonel Simon Villa, chief of staff and a 
third insurgent leader who managed to escape when the shooting began. 
After about twenty minutes, Segovia excused himself and left the 
house. When he reached the Macabebes, whe had by now drawn up into 
formation, he shouted an order which was unintelligible to the in-
26 
surgents. Instantly the Macabebes began firing on Aguinaldo's body-
guard which had formed into position across the way. The insurgents, 
who did not have their rifles loaded, fled leaving behind them two 
dead comrades, eighteen rifles and about one thousand rounds of amnru-
nition. Segovia, after giving the order to fire, re-entered the .house 
and confronted the insurgents with a revolver. 27 Tal Placido, at this 
instant, .lunged for Aguinaldo, but the three insurgent officers drew 
their guns and formed a shie;ld around their:· -p:r:esident. Barcelona told 
26 Aguinaldo, "The Story of My Capture," 138. 
27 Aguinaldo, A Second Look At America-, 128. 
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Segovia not to shoot as they would surrender, and at the same time he 
enfolded Aguinaldo in a bear hug to prevent the president from using 
his gun. "Don't sacrifice yourself," cried Barcelona, "the country 
needs your life."28 Then according to Aguinaldo's version of the 
affair, Segovia fired point blank on the huddled group of insurgents, 
hitting Villa three times, but not seriously wounding him, thus giving 
substance to Aguinaldo's scornful remarks concerning the Spaniard's 
marksmanship. 29 Aguinaldo, Barcelona and Villa then surrendered while 
the .fourth Filipino vaulted out the window and into the ·river below, 
which he -swam to make his escape. 
At this point the American officers arrived and restored order 
among the Macabebes, who were completely disorganized and firing at 
random. The Filipino prisoners were made comfortable and Dr. Barcelona 
dressed Villa's wounds. Funston's conunand sustained one casuality, a 
Macabebe who was grazed on the .forehead when one -of Aguinaldo's re-
treating body-guards managed, in the confusion., to load his rifle : and 
return fire. Fortunately, the rumor that Palanan had been reinforced 
by a band of four-hundred guerrillas proved to be spurious and the 
company, which was in poor fighting trim after the grueling march, had 
only to contend with the president's personal force of fifty men. 
No attempt was made to pursue the fleeing insurgents, as such an-en-
deavor would have been futile in the dense jungle. The inhabitants of 
the town had also vanished, leaving a plentiful supply of cracked corn, 
rice,and sweet potatoes for the near-famished soldiers. The village 
28Aguinaldo, "The Story of My Capture," 139. 
29Aguinaldo, ! Second Look At America, 128. 
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still bore the .festive trappings of the previous day's conunemoration 
of Aguinaldo's birthday. Amid the gay decorations the party spent the 
night of the Twenty-third and the following day in relaxation and re-
cuperation. On March 25th the column left Palanan and headed for the 
sea and the pre-arranged meeting with the Vicksburg. Shortly after 
noon the gunboat was sighted and within two hours all had embarked for 
the long journey home. 
Aguinaldo and his companions were ac-corded the most favorable 
treatment after their capture but nothing could erase the memory of 
Funston's so-called treachery and, writing of the affair over a half-
century later, Aguinaldo termed the -colonel's exploit "an ungentle-
manly and unsportsmanlike ruse". 30 The Filipino president subsequently 
cooperated with the United States and even appealed to his people to 
give up the hopeless struggle. 
Funston was welcomed a hero in many quarters and was commissioned 
a Brigadier General in the United States Army. However, there were 
others who ·considered his actions to be below the di,ghity of an Ameri-
can officer. Intellectuals, fellow officers and a few journalists were 
among those who were repelled by Funston's effrontery in requesting 
food from his intended victim. The forged letters also drew a barrage 
of contemptuous criticism. Few ventured to question his courage or 
resourcefulness, however. Even General Emilio Aguinaldo could not 
bring himself to condemn the audacious colonel. In analyzing his 
sentiments toward Funston, the little president remarked; 
Strangely, I developed an undefinable ·admiration for 
Funston. He had previously been in the Cuban War and 
30Ibid., 17. 
spoke Spanish quite tolerably. .The .fact that we had both 
fought against the Spaniards gave us a common backgroun~, 
and the Spanish.language enabled us to communicate di-
rectly •. I now observed him to be .a dia~ond·in the rough. 
A husky, almost muscle ·bound man, he .was literally 
hard as nails. But I felt, too, that he had a big heart-. 
He had fierce ·courage. He was resourceful to the·extreme. 
And, at the height ofhis personal triumph, he :was simple, 
matter of fact, and even humble-.31 
31Ibid., 129. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE STORM BREAKS IN WASHINGTON 
As a result of his record in the Philippines General Funston be-
came the idol of those Americans who still cherished the rugged, imii-
vidualistic frontier qualities which had accompanied the nation's · 
meteoric rise to prominence among the most .powerful states on earth. 
However, among more thoughtful Americans, an undesirable strain of 
opportunism and ruthlessness was perceived in the young officer. This 
was entirely inconsistent with the new role assumed by the United States 
in international politics. No longer could we afford the belligerence 
and irresponsibility that characterized the earlier American tempera-
ment. We had matured now and must cast aside childish things. Thus, 
Funston -was censured in the popular literature o.f the day by such 
figures as E. L. Godkin and Mark Twain . The latter wrote a scathing 
denunciation of the methods employed in the capture of Aguinaldo, 
utilizing the stinging sarcasm of which only he was capable. 1 
Unfortunately, many of Funston's ·detractors were not moved by 
moral considerations. A great deal o.f resentment existed -bec-ause the 
young Kansan had not risen through the accepted channels to fame and 
status in the army. Of course, much of the controversy stemmed from 
the ,fact that Funston was forced to resort to unorthodox measures .for 
he was not a West Point graduate, and had he been, the inertia of a 
1Mark Twain, "A Defense of General Funston," North American Review, 
CLXXIV (May, 1902), 613-624. 
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regular army career might have stifled one of his ambition. Funston 
was not -alone in this respect, for many wide-ly criticized promotions 
were made during the Spanish-American War and the Philippine conflict 
which followed. Especially did the elevation of Leonard Wood stimu-
late charges of favoritism. 
The potential political impact of army abuses was not lost on the 
opponents of the administration, and the .Democrats employed tactics 
that would have made a Funston blanch in their eagerness to discredit 
the Republicans. Had the army exhibited a greater degree of soli-
darity, it could have saved itself much anguish, but many rose from 
its ranks to indict the military policy of the United States before 
the watching eyes of the .whole world. Aside -from the accusations of 
volunteer officers, which will be dealt with shortly, the harassed 
administration had to contend with the extortionate demands of Lieu-
tenant General Nelson A. Miles. In the midst of the senate investi-
gation of charges of cruelty by United States soldiers, Miles 
threatened to make public his report which included serious allega-
tions of army brutality. Only the supreme conunand in the Philippine 
Islands could deter Miles from publicizing his -incendiary account of 
army behavior. 2 Roosevelt refused to submit to this blackmail at-
tempt and deplored Miles' holier than thou attitude, pointing to the 
outrages of the Indian wars in which the ·general played a major role-. 3 
Roosevelt's belligerence gained him nothing and Miles aired his charges 
by releasing his report to the public. 
2Elting E. Morison, ed •. , The Letters of Theadore Roosevelt (8 
vols., Cambridge, Mass -•. , Harvard University Press, 1951), 232-. 
3Ibid .-, 232·. 
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The Republicans noted with alarm the .growing torrent of criticism 
and acted to head off any .groundswell of popular reaction. Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge-, under pressure, introduced a bill calling for an 
investigation of army conduct and the Senate appointed a committee. 
Lodge sat as chairman of the conmdttee and in that capacity ·rendered 
valuable service to the administration, but he :was destined to be over-
shadowed by the fiery Senator -from Ohio, Albert J • . Beveridge. -Beveridge 
played the part o.f attorney .for the defense, as it appeared that the 
army was on trial itself, not just those individuals who stood accused. 4 
Beveridge was not in dire need of publicity; his reputation had 
preceded him. He was known as the prophet of imperialism because of his 
persistent cries for economic expansion in the Orient. He considered it 
a disservice to American businessmen to abandon the newly won territory 
in the Pacific. .In a geo-poli tical sense, he considered control of the 
Pacific tantamount to control of the .world. 5 In January, 1900, he de-
livered a speech to a packed Senate chamber :which resounded inter-
nationally. Galleries crowded with foreign diplomats heard him de-
nounce any talk of withdrawihg from the Philippines and espouse the 
cause of Ameri~an nationalism and imperialism. He unabashedly struck 
a strong racial note, exalting the "English speaking and Teutonic 
peoples" who had been prepared ·by God to administer "savages and senile 
peoples". 6 Such was the temper in an age when Kipling could write of 
the "white man's burden"; Beveridge was not crying in a wilderness. 
4c1aude G. Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era (Cambridge, 
Mass •. , Houghton Mifflin Company, 1932), 180. 
5Ibid., 119. 
6Ibid., 121. 
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The hearings before the investigating committee began in January, 
1902 and continued until June -. They were marked by frequent acidic 
exchanges among the Senators. William H. Taft, Admiral Dewey, Generals 
MacArthur, Otis and Hughes were am0ng the prominent figures who paraded 
before the committee. However, the excitement was intensified when the 
enlisted men were brought before the senators. Beveridge exerted himself 
to the limit of his ability in attempting to discredit the testimony of 
the damaging witnesses, and if he could not do that, he endeav0red to 
neutralize or soften their charges ... An excellent illustration of his 
tactics was his handling of the "water cure" issue. Accusations that 
American soldiers -had practiced this method of torture to extract in-
formation from the Filipinos had been a major source of irritation to 
the army. One man who had served in the .Philippines swore that -he 
personally -had seen General Funston administer the "water cure", and 
declared that Funston had invented thi-s loathsome procedure. 7 Funston 
stated, in an affadavit presented as evidence, that _he had never 
witnessed an application of the ''lvater cure", but that from what he had 
heard it was "orte of the ·most . effe·ctive methods and one ·of the most 
humane" · for obtaini~g · irtformation.;8 : He. hastened t,.vadd -that he did not 
believe -in torture of any type .and -·blame.d· the Ma-cabebes .; for the use of the 
"water :cure" • • Funston als.o opined that the tormen.ting devi,.c~ w:as not .. 
nea·r-ly as severe as it had· been d~pi0,ted in the press., and that i;t :was. 
accompanied by "nothing more than a few moments of strangling and never 
?statement made by John Nicholson submitted to Committee on 
Philippines, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Document -331, part 3, 2260. 
8statement made by Funston submitted to committee, 57th Cong., 
1st Sess., Senate Document 331, part 3, 2261. 
9 
resulted fatally". 
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Beveridge took up the argument that the "water cure" was compara-
tively harmless even though its use could hardly be condoned. He born-
barded each incriminati~g witness with questions. Had anyone -died under 
this treatment? Were they able to walk away afterwards? As he gener-
ally succeeded in evoking favorable responses, Beveridge deprived the 
Democrats of much political thunder. The American: public was impressed 
by inhuman atrocities but could hardly be expected to be aroused greatly 
by a practice which was treated by a Senator with such levity. Beveridge 
had made the "water cure" appear more as a practical joke than a heinous 
form of torment. Few Americans could be as objective about it when the 
Japanese subjected United States soldiers to the same treatment during 
World War II. 
The charges of rape and the burning of entire villages were much 
more difficult ·to deflect and Beveridge and his cohorts were taxed 
severely in their efforts to maintain the honor and dignity of the 
anny. On the alleged practice of putting native villages to the torch, 
Beveridge was forced to take a harsh military position of expediency. 
Had not the houses containing women and children also shielded snipers 
who -fired in ambush on American soldiers? Were not the structures that 
were burned of a·very flimsy, cheap construction that could be replaced 
in a short time with a minimum of time and labor?10 
The Democratic opposition on the committee included such able 
men as Edward Ward Carmack of Tennessee, Ch~rles Culberson of Texas 
9Letter from Funston to Adjutant General of the Army, 57th Cong.-, 
1st Sess ., Senate Document 331, part 2, 2261. 
10Testimony of Seiward J. Norton, 57th Cong •. , 1st Sess.-, Senate 
Document ~31, part 3, 2904. 
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and Thomas M. Patterson of Colorado. They proved to be formidable 
adversaries in the bitter political duel. Patterson was a free silver 
Democrat who had refused to support Cleveland in 1892 and had embraced 
the Populist party the following year. In 1900 he had actively sup-
ported the rabidly anti-imperialist Bryan. Elected to the Senate by 
a coalition of Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans, he had 
announced his i ntention to return to the Democratic fold upon taking 
his seat. 11 
On March 27, 1902, Patterson launched a verbal attack on Funston, 
managing also to smear the administration very effectively by identi-
fying Roosevelt with the rash statements which the often tactless 
young general was prone to make. On the floor of the Senate, Patterson 
quoted an article in the morning press in which Funston wrathfully re-
taliated against the eastern newspapers who had the audacity to critize 
his Lotos Club speech in New York. He denied using dishonorable means 
to capture Aguinaldo and refuted charged that he had violated the Arti-
cles of War. According to Funston, Roosevelt had approved of his 
speech and had expressed a desire to have him deliver a similar speech 
in Boston at the invitation of Senator Lodge. Skillfully, Patterson 
avoided any comment on the substance of Funston's speech. He declared 
that he ignored Funston's suggestion that those people who demanded 
justice for the Filipinos and evacuation of the islands deserved hangi ng 
more than the insurgents. 12 Funston considered that the -anti-imperi-
alist furor in the United States was costing American lives by encouraging 
11s7th Cong., 1st Sess., Official Congressional Directory, 10. 
12congressional Record, 57th Cong~, ,1st Sess.,part 4, ·3326. 
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the Filipino rebels in their resistance. What Patterson objected -to 
was the .fact that Funston had taken refuge under the protective wing 
of Roosevelt. 13 
Patterson then proceeded to quote .from international law books 
on the subject of civilized wavfare -and referred to the recently rati-
fied Hague Treaty and the code approved by President Lincoln in 1863 as 
General Orders no-. 100 which .governed the -conduct of United States 
armies in the field. Continuing, Patterson next read from Funston's 
account of the capture of Aguinaldo, interjecting frequent comments 
on the degree of conformity with the rules of war displayed -in Funston's 
actions. James C. Spooner came to Funston's rescue ·by inquiring 
whether the rules of war were applicable in the insurrection which was 
not civilized warfare but an exceptionally vicious type .of guerilla 
conflict. Patterson was asked if he had read the -rule concerning guer-
14 illa warfare. 
The verbal exchange was concluded by Patterson's return to the 
orginal issue. The Senator from Colorado expressed doubt as to whether 
Funston was warranted in using the name of Theodore Roosevelt or Henry 
Cabot Lodge in his defense. He deduced from Funston's statements that 
the general would render valuable service to the Republicans as a 
campaign orator. In view of this Patterson stated that he was only 
concerned that the American people got the facts. A month .later, 
President Roosevelt was compelled to rebuke Funston .publicly for his 
attack on Senator George F. Hoar, the anti-imperialist Republican 
13Ibid., 3326. 
14 Ibid., 3329. 
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from Massachusetts. Funston had expressed sympathy for Hoar, whom he 
considered was suffering from an "overheated conscience":.15 The gener-
al was ordered to refrain from further public discussion of the Phi-
lippine situation. Roosevelt also e.xpressed his regret that a United 
States Senator should be made the object of public criticism.16 Ap-
parently the pronouncement from Roosevelt was .prompted by a request 
for a leave of absence on the part of General Funston for the purp0se 
of delivering an address at the Middlesex Club in Boston. 
The ,army suffered nruch embarrassment during the hearings, but 
certainly one of the most damaging witnesses was Richard T. O'Brien, 
a former corporal with the American fo.rces in the Philippines. O'Brien 
put Beveridge and his associates to the acid test. He apparently had 
an intimate · knowledge of nearly every category of abuse charged again-
st United States soldiers. His testimony covered everything from rape 
and the shooting of pris-0ners to the ,use of dum-dum bullets. Indeed, 
many witnesses could relate a choice few instances of brutality that 
they had seen or heard about, but none ,were as versatile as the corpo-
ral. O'Brien testified that he had seen heads of Filipinos literally 
torn from their bodies and that he had noted at various times that 
some insurgents were eviscerated by rifle fire. This he attributed to 
the use of expanding or exploding bullets which -he said were issued by 
army ordnance. The Republicans immediately brought before the com-
mittee the United States chief of ordnance who deftly refuted the al-
legations of the young corporal and gave technical reasons for the 
15New -York Times, April 25, 1902-, p • . J. 
16Ibid. 
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phenomena described by him. 17 Senator Carmack conceded that none of 
the ·committee believed that dum-dum bullets had been issued by the army 
but the possibility that the ammunition had been tampered with by indi-
vidual soldiers was not overlooked. 
O'Brien also told of observing the cold blooded killing of two old 
men wh0 were sh0t dawn when they approached advancing American troops. 
According to the witness, they were .walking hand in hand and waving a 
white flag.18 A Republican Senator harried the corporal into admitting 
that perhaps the flag could have been .obscured for an instant but the 
fact -remained that the vision of the Americans was unimpaired to the 
extent that they could perforate the two Filipinos .with Krag bullets. 
The big sensation of O'Brien's testimony was the alleged rape of 
a beautiful Spanish woman. Although it was not expressly stated, un-
doubtedly much of the revulsion felt by the Senators stemmed from the 
fact that the woman was at least part European. Similar charges in-
volving native women did -not invoke as much ·righteous indignation. 
Four officers and an undetermined number of enlisted men were accused 
of participating in the crime. Beveridge; anxious to limit the ghastly 
affair to specified individuals, pressed for the names of those in-
volved. Patterson objected, pointing out that the witness had merely 
quoted the woman's husband and other dubious sources and that he was 
therefore -not subject to perjury charges. Patterson was probably 
correct in assuming that Beveridge would attempt to discredit the 
testimony by legal action. At this juncture there occurred the 
17restimony of Brig. Gen. William Crozier, 57th Cong., 1st Sess •. , 
Senate Document . 331, part 3, 2576. 
18 57th Cong. , 1st Sess .-, Senate Document 331, part 3, 2550. 
following argument indicative of the nature of the investigation. 
Senator Patterson: I thi nk the connnittee i s doing a grave 
injustice by mentioning the names o.f these men. 
The Chairman (Lodge): Instead of doing an i njustice, it 
seems to me that the -connnittee -is on the road to doing 
justice. 
Senator Patterson: The attitude of Senator Beveridge as 
well as the chairman has been in the nature of a menace 
to this witness. 
The Chairman: No more in the -attitude of menace than you 
[addressing Senator Patterso.!!7 have been in the attitude 
of defending him. 
Senator Patterson: I deny that I have been defending the 
witness, and there is no call for such a statement. 
The Chairman: And I deny that I have -in any way attempted 
to menace the witness-. 
Senator Dietrich (Rep., Nebr.): I want to say that ever 
since this investigation conunenced, .you [addressing Senator 
Patterso.!!7 have encouraged everything to besmirch the Ameri-
can army and done nothing to bring out anything to the .honor 
of the army. 
Senator Patterson: The Senato.r .from -Nebraska ought to be 
ashamed of himself for making such a statement. The truth 
is exactly contrary to ,what he has said, and what he has 
said is absolutely untrue. 
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Senator Dietrich: I say it is true, ad I repeat that the 
Senator's efforts .have been to ·bring out everything he 
could against the army.19 
In the course of the investigation, the conuni ttee uncovered two 
army inquiries involving the Twentieth Kansas. Both were ordered by 
the Department of War as a result of accusations made by members of 
Funston' s regiment. Primarily, these allegations centered upon the 
execution of two or thre·e Filipino prisoners at the battle of Caloocan 
on February 10, 1899. Colonel Wilder s. Metcalf was accused of issuing 
the order to shoot the pri soners and -of killing one of the capti ves 
19Ibid.~ 2579-2580. 
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personally while the poor wretch .pleaded for mercy.20 Funston was 
charged with attempting to interfere with the inquiries to shield 
Metcalf and also ,with .giving instruction that .no prisoners should be 
taken at Caloocan. Several officers and enlisted men made sworn affi-
davits in which they indicted .Funsten ·and Metcalf for these offenses. 
The most damaging witnes.ses . later -retracted their statements, one of 
them claining an enemy of Funston had persuaded him to sign, while 
inebriated;· .. a document which incriminated Metcalf.. 21 This incident 
was not the only indication that regimental animosities were the source 
of many of the charges made against Funston and his .friends. In an-
other instance, Edmund Boltwood, a former captain of the Twentieth 
Kansas wh<il was ·instrumental in .gathering .evidence against Funston and 
Metcalf, admitted that he resented certain "unfair" promotions that 
had been made in the regiment. 22 Boltwood was a veteran of the Civil 
War who expected, in view of his· military experience, to be elevated 
in rank, but his aspirations were frustrated by Funston. 
In a similar vein was the bitter, wrathful testimony of John F. 
Hall, ,who had served in Funston's connnand as a First Lieutenant. This 
man's inflammatory charges prompted the War Department to initiate the 
second inquiry into the behavior of the officers of the Twentieth 
Kansas.23 Hall did not -disguise his hatred for Funston, and ·in his 
20Affidavit made by Harris O. Huskey submitted to connnittee, 57th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Document 331, .part .2, 1442-. 
21Retraction of earlier statement by Harris O. Huskey, 57th Cong., 
1st Sess., Senate Document 331, part 2, 1452. 
22 Statement of Lt. Col. John S. Mallory, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 
Senate Document 331, .part 2·, 1456. 
23Dispatch from Adjutant General's office to the C0mmanding General, 
Department of the Pacific:, 57th Cong •. , 1st Sess •. , Senate Document 331, 
part 2·, 1446. 
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apparent -eagerness to malign the.general's character he revealed his 
irritation .with -the . pu'.blici ty ;given ·to his· regimental co:mmamler. -In 
words -dripping with venom, he termed the general a fraud, .referl'ing 
specifically to Funston's celebrated.feat of-swimming a,river-in the 
face of -enemy .fire-. This . .famous incident .was nothing ·but a figment 
of Funston' s -fe:rtile imagination. Not only-was he ,a' liar but he ,also 
-wa-s -a·coward; he left ·the dangerous tasks to others and then cl~imed 
credit for·their heroics. 24 Concerning such accusations, Funst0n ex-
plained that on April 26:, 1899:, -he and a ·sma-11 skirmishing .party -swam 
the -Bag-Bag.river, a s·tream a bout -100 ·f ee-t .wide· which emptied -:into the 
Rio G:rartd·e river. On the following day, ·two· Kansas men crossed the 
Rio Grande with a small .rope which they used to ·bring across-a larger 
rope.. Then Funston and -a detachment --of 45 men .were -towed to the _Qppo-
-site ,shore on a -raf't. The -fir'st -crossing had been ·-confused .with that 
of the Rio Grande-, and-, quite understandably·, · s0me -·believed -that 
Funston-had taken-credit ·in his official reports for an accomplishment 
for which others -had, risked their lives-. 25 
After esta-blishing the -.fact that "the motives of -Funston' s accusers 
_.were questionable:, ·the -case against the general cannot be dismiss-ed 
completely. Neither of the army inquiries found sufficient evidence 
to indict Funston, but the inve-stigations · left ma-ny · unans:wered 
que.stions-. Damaging testimony, ·in most cases--, -was -deemed either -un-
trustworthy or conflicting. The guilt was· effectively transfer.red to 
24Affidavit made by John F •. Hal:l, 57th Cong •. , 1st Sess-•. , -Se-nate 
-Document · "331, part 2, -1443 • · 
25Anon.-,. "He Snared ·Aguinaldo·,". Literary Digest-, LIV (March,10·, 
1917), 644. 
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enlisted men and company officers. Most notable, however, was the 
failure of the army to institute court-martial proceedings against 
those wh0 had admittedly lied in their earlier affidavits • . Their 
immunity from prosecution for what could be considered a reprehensi-
ble crime was the result of army reluctance to _press the issue. 
Major General Harrison Gray Otis, in -a letter to the Judge Advo-
ca te of the Department of the Pacific, .suggested that action be taken 
against .privates Charles E. Brenner and William H. Putnam.26 Brenner 
had stirred a hornet's nest with his published account of the execution 
--of several Filipino prisoners.. He had quoted one company officer as 
lamenting the fact that the captives had to ·be shot but that he was 
merely obeying orders from his superiors. Putnam had admitted 
shooting a prisoner -during the battle of Caloocan. The Judge Advo-
cate replied that it was not conclusive that Brenner had made false 
charges for he had merely intended to quote the officer's relation 
of the incident. Concerning Putnam, the Judge Advocate pointed out 
that his only defense would be a lawful order from his superior offi-
cer. On the advisibility of trying Putnam, he commented: 
If put on trial, it is probable that facts .would develop 
implicating many others. I doubt the propriety of his 
trial and am of the opinion that considerations of public 
policy, sufficiently grave to silence every other demand, 
r equire that no -further action be taken in this case.2-7 
Upon receiving this frank estimate from the Judge Advocate, General 
Otis wrote, in a dispatch to the Adjutant General of the Army; "After 
mature deliberation I doubt the wisdom of a court-martial in this 
2657th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Document 331, part 2, 1447. 
27Ibid., 1447. 
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case ••• n28 Otis justified his conclusion on the grounds that prose-
cution would give the Filipinos ,legal basis for their charges of in-
humane treatment at the hands of Amer-ican soldiers. He granted that 
conditions existing early in the-insurrection had given rise to abuses, 
but he said much.good will had since been won by the Americans and 
this amity should not be jeopardized by further·scandal.29 
The committee hearings. closed, in June, 1902_ •. Funston' s reputation 
was damaged somewhat, but., otherwi·se, he came through the ordeal un-
scathed. For that matter, so did nearly every other officer implicated 
in the investigation. ..The Democrats were more interested in political 
capital than in the quest for justice~ . In the .process·, . however, the 
army officers were "over their heads in party politics," as Bowers so 
aptly expressed it.30 For years Beveridge enjoyed a large measure .of 
popularity with the army and for good reason. The Senator from Ohio 
had rendered·invaluable aid both to the army and to the Republican 
party in their hour of need •. Yet, in the final analysis, it was the 
apathy of the American public that .prevented the Democrats from reaping 
their full propaganda harvest. The people were weary of hearing about 
the Philippines, an:d were largely unconcerned about an alien race. 31 
And so, the intellectuals raved on, but they~ crying in a wilder-
ness. 
28 Ibid. , 1448. 
29Ibid., 1448. 
30Bowers, Beveridge and the Progressive Era, 182-. 
31Karl Schriftgiesser, The Gentleman From Massachusetts (Boston, 
Little, Brown and Company, .1944}, 203. 
CHAPTER IV 
ON TO.VERA CRUZ 
After the ·capture of Aguinaldo, General Funston remained-in the 
Philippine Islands until November 1, 1901, -in command of the Second 
Separate Brigade:, Department of North Philippines. His tour of duty 
in the far east had· been immensely ·successful. Once a romantic ad-
venturer-, .he -now had a promising .future -opened for -him and he assumed 
his new role with the sincere and-responsible attitude so vital-in 
his chosen profession. True·, .he had become ·involved -in petty re-gi-
mental politics, but this would have 0been a trivial matter but for 
the untimely Senate ·investigation-which allowed his enelllies an excel-
lent -oppartunity to overcome the military impediments af rank and 
influence and to appeal directly to the ·nation. On the positive side 
of the ledger, however:, Funston had wan some valuable friends in civil 
and military life-, _particularly the esteem-and admi·ration of General 
Arthur MacArthur .1 His son, Douglas MacArthur-, who . was to ·become a 
popular hero to a later .generation of Americans, idolized Funston. 
Upon his return ta the United.States, Funston.was .placed .in com-
mand of the Department of the Colorado with headquarters in Denver. 
Here he weathered the storm that broke ·in Washington :with, the con-
vening of the Lodge committee. Years ·later,, William Allen White, 
!Frazier Hunt, The Untold Story !! . Douglas -Mac.Arthur .(New York, 
Devin-Adair Company, 1954), 17·. 
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close f riend and fraternity brother at the University of Kansas , wrote 
that Roosevelt had asked him to impress upon Funston the impropri et y 
of publicly excoriating his many critics. 2 White surmised that his 
old college chum was suffering from the same weakness which had 
plagued him in his student days; Funston could not hol d his l iquor . 3 
He was probably deeply immersed in his cups when he made the ·statement 
which prompted the chasti sement from the president. When White re-
proached the gener al for his antics, "Timmy" (Funston) replied; "0 
Billy, look not upon the gin rickey when it is red, and giveth color 
in the .cup, for i t playeth hell and repeat with poor Tinuny."4 Although 
some accusations were made against the general concerning his consum-
tion of alcohol, there was no substantial evidence that his low satura-
tion point ever interfered with his -duti es. Hi s excesses were prob-
ably confined to social functions, and, in view of his limited capa-
city for spirits, .he could not have been guilty of any sizable intake 
of intoxicants. 
Funston attacked the abolition of the post canteen's dispensation 
of beer in his annual report to the Secretary of War in 1902-. 5 This 
forced those who desired nothing but a few drinks and a .little relaxa-
tion to .resort t o the var i ous saloons and dives whi ch had sprung up 
around the army posts. Here the men were accosted by prostitutes and 
were often robbed and physically abused. Venereal disease took a 
heavy toll of army men every year and Funston, in the course of his 
2white, Autobi ographY, 501. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibi d. 
557th Cong . , 2nd Sess., House Document 2, volume 9, 26 . 
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career, offered·many suggestions .for combatting the scourge. 
Funston's next command was the Department of the Columbia which 
he held for two years until he was transferred to the Department of 
the Lakes in September, 1904. These were uneventful years i'or the 
general; the army had settled into a lethargic state best evidenced 
by the large desertion rate and the many military offenses reported by 
Funston~ Low pay and the monotony of peace time garrison duty were 
partly responsible for the poor morale in Funston's command. .Fortu,-
nately, there were still enough foreign military commitments to justify 
the maintenance of some semblance .of an army. However, as late as 
1914, there :were less than 100,000 men under arms out of a nation of 
over 100,000,000 people. Funston pleaded in vain for an·increase in 
pay of 50 percent for the officers ami · 30 percent for enlisted men. in the 
hope of enabling the army to attract more desi:rable personnel. 6 This 
would be no more expensive than the practice of trying to make · ·soldiers 
of an "inferior class of men".7 Funston admiringly observed the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police just across the border .from his department. 
There was no reason, opined the general, why the United States Army 
could not attain the excellent standards of the R.C.M.P., where de-
sertion was almost unknown and even privates 'Could be entrusted with 
confidential and difficult tasks. 8 In contrast to this splendid mili-
tary organization, Funston complained.of shirkers who preferred living 
the soft life of the guardhouse to soldiering. Apparently the.guard 
6 Funston' s annual report to the Secretary of War, ·57th Cong •. , . 3rd 
Sess·., House Document 2, volume 3, 200. 
7 Ibid • , 201. 
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house was most popular during bad weather. Funston suggested reme-
dying this situation by making prison rations less palatable than 
normal army fare. 9 
In the spring of 1905, Funston moved to the Department of 
California, with headquarters in San Francisco. Here he was destined 
to win recognition and also to enjoy a great deal of respect and 
affection .from the inhabitants. The people adopted him as their own 
hero and long after his departure he had their support and good will. 
San Francisco was the home af Funstan; his wife was reared there and 
it ·became his final resting place after his death in 1917. While 
stationed at various pasts in the United States and abroad, the 
family residence was maintained in that city. He was residing ·in a 
hotel when the famous San: Francisco earthquake struck. 
Early in the morning of April 18, 1906, Funstan -was awakened by 
the terrific shock waves which were to be the cause of much agony in 
the ensuing days.lo The earthquake ruptured gas-, water, and sewage 
lines throughout the city, and disrupted communication lines. As 
Funston hastened on faot to the business section of the city, he saw, 
from his vantage point on ·high ground, the beginning of the fires 
which eventually destroyed most af San Francisco.11 Realizing the 
great peril to the citizens and the inadequacy of the palice to pro-
tect life and property, the general placed the federal troops at the 
disposal of the city.12 Finding it impossible to ·cotmnunicate with the 
9Ibid., 201. 
1
~eport of the Secretary of War to the President, ·59th Cong., 
2nd Sess., House Document 2-, volume 1, 19. 
11Ibid. 
12Ibid. 
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army posts because of the destruction of the lines, Funston alter-
nately ran and ' walked to the quartermaster's stable, over a mile 
away. There he dispatched a rider to the connnandants of Fort Mason 
and the Presidio, with instruction to turn out their entire garrisons 
and report for duty to the chief of police. 
Funston was acting in the absence of the Pacific Division ~ornmander 
whose headquarters was ·also in San Francisco. Major General Adolphus 
Greely was on leave and at the time the ·news of · the catastrophe·was being 
spread across the nation, he was in Omaha. As his baggage had pre-
ceded him to Chicago, Greeley continued to that city where, .upon 
learning the magnitude of the disaster, he decided to return to his 
c ommand.13 Although he was probably not pleased that Funston had 
monopolized the attention of the country with his swift and -effective 
action and had left only the less glamorous task of cleaning up and 
feeding the populace to him, Greely sanctioned Function's policy. 
Obviously, it would have been difficult to consult with Greeley in 
view of the destruction of the communication lines and the ·time con-
sumed by contacting the division commander could hardly have ·been 
justified on humanitarian grounds. 
From April 18 to ·the twenty-second, General Funston was in charge 
of the efforts to save the city. He found that national guardsmen, 
regular army troops, naval units and city police were scattered in-
discriminately over the city, making it difficult to coordinate and 
direct the activities of the various forces. To provide some order . 
in the rescue operations and the enforcement of martial law declared 
13Funston' s report to Maj. Gen. Adolphus W. Greeley, commanding 
Pacific Division, 59th Cong •. , 2nd Sess., House Document 2, volume 1, 91. 
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by Funston, the general met with the mayor, the commander of the 
California National Guard and the chief of police, and divided·the 
city.into three districts which would be administered by the federal, 
14 
state, and local organizations separately. 
Besides protecting the citizens and the property of the city, 
the army u~d~tibtedly .played a very important ·.role ·by ·ins.piring con-
fidence in the populace and preventing mob violence resulting from 
panic. Rumors flew through the area; some said that the whole country 
was destroyed or inundated·by tidal waves. Several men were shot by 
national guardsmen and the newspapers expanded·these incidents into 
accounts of large scale slaughter of looters and trespassers by the 
soldiers. .In an atmosphere such as this, the army-was an ·important 
stabilizing .factor. Later;, when·examined in a more sober light, many 
of the wild stories.of the-earthquake proved·to be unfounded·in fact. 
The army denied that any regular had been involved in the shootings and 
stated that all the .furor resulted .. froru the few instances when the 
guardsmen had.fired on civilians.15 
Until the crisis in San,Francisco, Funston had displayed dash 
and daring but little else. However, he exhibited cool courage and 
the ability to think and act in the-midst of the confusion and hysteria 
which resulted.from the earthquake •. His powers of organization, de-
veloped by his years in administrative positions, were a valuable asset 
to the embattled citizens of the bay city. Certainly-his hanqling of 
this situation gave Funston ada.e.d stature. 
14Ibid., 95. 
15special report of Greely, -59th Cong.-, 2nd Sess., House Document 
2, volume 1, 98. 
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In -his report .for the fiscal year 1906, Funston again complained 
that army pay was far too low to allow the army man to lnaintain a 
living standard conunensurate with his importance.. He declared that 
in San Francisco a captain of twenty yea.rs service earned less than 
a bricklayer, plasterer or plumber. A hod carrier enjoyed .greater 
income than a Second Lieutenant.-16 Funston admitted that "exceptional 
c.onditions'1 prevailed in that city (presumably inflated wages resulting 
from the huge reconstructi·on projects in the ruined areas), but added 
that the officers had to bear the expense of sustaining a level of 
socially respectable standing which the laborer was not compelled to 
do. General officers were often stationed near metropolitan areas 
where their commutation was wholly inadequate to furnish them suit-
able accomodations. 17 Usually they were the recipients of much 
hospitality which they were often unable -to ·repay. An officer solely 
dependent upon his regular compensation could not meet these -social 
obligations. The enlisted men received such miserable wages that most 
of them did not re-enlist ~nd many deserted after only a few months 
service. 18 Funston reconunended a 50 per-cent pay raise· for non-com-
missioned officers and a similar increment .for privates after their 
initial term had been completed. His efforts were not rewarded until 
May, 1908, when Congress acted on the matter after persistent demands 
from many army officers had been ignored.19 Under the provisions of 
16Funston's annual report to the Secretary of War, 59th Cong., 
2nd Sess., ~ Document 2, volume 3, 190. 
17Ibid., 191. 
18Ibid. 
19william Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United States Army 
(New ·York, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942), 431. 
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the new law, enlisted men's wages during their first term ranged .from 
$15 a month for a private to $45 for a First Sergeant. Commissioned 
officers' salaries began at $1,700 annually for a Second Lieutenant 
and reached a peak of $11,000 -for a Lieutenant General. As a Briga-
dier General, Funston's yearly income was $6,000. 
In the late summer of 1906, an insurrection in Cuba prompted the 
United States to intervene in that island's internal affairs. On 
September 14, the president directed William H. Taft, the Secretary 
of War; ·and Assistant Secretary of State Bacon to take measures to 
bring about a peaceful settlement of the revolt. By -order of the 
president, Funston -was assigned to command the United States forces 
in Cuba, consisting of a unit .designated as the First Expeditionary 
Brigade. 20 He received thi-s appointment by virtue of his .familiarity 
with some of the Cuban leaders and his acquaintance with the fighting 
methods of the islanders. Apparently, Funston was considered im-
portant to ·the mission primarily because open guerrilla warfare be-
tween the revolutionists and the American troops was feared, in which 
case ·the general's experience in such .matters would make him a great 
asset. 21 He was expected to command the troops in the advent of 
hostilities but otherwise the administration had no intention of giving 
him supreme conunand of the forces -in Cuba.22 
After only a few days service in Cuba, Funston relinquished .his 
conunand on October 12. Taft-, who acted as .governor of the island 
20irunston's annual report, War Department, Annual Reperts, 1907, 
volume -3, 313. 
21New York~, October 18, 1906, p. -5. 
2_2Ibid., October 19, 1906, -p. 7. 
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during the American intervention, accused the general of bungling the 
operation of returrting property seized by the rebels to the rightful 
owners. 23 The revolutionists were issued certificates which authori-
zed them to retain the horses they had taken until the original owners 
appeared to repossess the animals. However, the certificates, which 
were written in Spanish, were so worded that it seemed that those who 
were in current possession of the horses had been given permanent title 
to them. 24 To resolve the problem, it was decided to allow the rebels 
to keep the horses they had seized and to compensate the real owners 
from state funds . Some believed that this mistake was the cause of 
Funston's removal, but others considered the whole incident indicative 
of Taft's eagerness to appease the insurrectionists.25 However, on 
October 10, two days before Funston vacated his position, the Cuban 
provisional government, in a fonnal statement, announced that the work 
of the Peace Commission was finished and that Secretaries Taft and 
Bacon, as well as Funston, were to return to the United States.26 This 
would seem to imply that the general left Cuba because his services 
were no longer required and nCilt because he had improperly discharged 
his duty. 
The .fact that Funston was not entrusted .with the delicate task 
of unscrambling Cuban politics after disarmament had been effected 
might have been an .indication that the general was ·not yet enjoying 
23charles E. Chapman, A History of the Cuban Republic (New York, 
The Macmillan Company, 1927), 228. 
24rbid., 228. 
25rbiq., 229. 
26New York Times, October 18, 1906:, ·p • .S. 
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the full confidence of the administration. On the other .hand, it 
might have reflected the nature of the sit.uation as dominated by 
political considerations and the part the State Department was playing 
in the matter. Taft stated that Eunston .had done .his particular job 
well, but that thereafter there was no ·need to retain two generals on 
the island, and so Franklin Bell was selected for the demanding ad-
ministrative work which .followed pacification.27 
Shortly after Funston's return .from CU:ba, he found .himself in-
volved ·in an ugly labor dispute which proved to .have far reaching con-
stitutional implications. 28 Governor John Sparks of Nevada wired 
Roosevelt that he anticipated labor troubles which might result in 
violence and destruction .of property in the mining area around Gold-
field. He requested federal troops to prevent such an occurrence, 
intimating that local authorities were unable to cope with the situ-
ation. Roosevelt doubted the legality of such action and wanted the 
governor's call for troops made in accordance with -the constitution 
and statutes of the United States. The legal situation, as later ex-
plained to the Governor by Secretary of State Elihu Root-, was as 
m.llows: 
The calls upon the president on the part of the government 
of Nevada for the interposition of troops do not at pre-
sent satisfy ·the .requirement of the Constitution and the 
laws so as to justify orders that the military force .now 
at Goldfield shall take any affirmative action. If such 
action should be desired under the Constitution and section 
5297 of the Revised Statutes to ,suppress an insurrection a 
call nrust be made by the legislature of the State unless 
circumstances are such that the legislature can not be 
27Jbid., 5. 
28Bennet Milton Rich, The Presidents and Civil Disorder (Washing-
ton, D. c., The Brookings Institut~, 1941), 125-135. 
convened, and no statement or intimation .has been made 
that the legislature of Nevada can not be convened. 
Action under 5298 of the Revised Statutes relates only 
to the enforcement of the laws of the United States. 
Action under section 5299 of the Revised Statutes is 
to be taken ·not upon the call of the government of a 
State, but upon the judgment of the President of the 
United States that some portion or class of the people 
of a State are denied the equal protection of the laws 
to which they ,are entitled under the Constitution .of 
the United States.29 
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The presence of troops .at Goldfield .mentioned by Root referred 
to an action taken by Roosevelt which distinguished between making 
un:its available and actually using them. This occurred when Sparks 
dis.patched a second message to the president which -technically did 
not fulfill the statutory .requirements, -but Roosevelt was more inter-
ested in substance than form and he complied with the governor's re-
quest for troeps. 30 He directed the acting Secretary of War to order 
General Funston to send a sufficient number of men to be "wholly ade-
quate to meet any emergency."31 However; as the .facts began to emerge, 
Roosevelt's attitude changed and he refused to allow the army to inter-
vene with0ut le.gal justification. 
At Goldfield, the .local branch of the Western Federation .of 
Miners:, led by Henry McKennon, a brother-in-law of "Big Bill" Haywood, 
had gone on strike. The immediate cause was the decision by -the mine 
operators to pay the workers in scrip instead of cash because of the 
currency shortage .resulting from :the .economic .crisis.32 A great deal 
2960th Cong., 1st Sess., -House Document 607, 6. 
30Juch, The Presidents and Civil Di·sorder, 127. 
3
~orison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt-, 86'3. 
32Ibid . , 863n. 
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of resentment already existed among the miners because of the refusal 
of the operators to recognize the union. When the soldiers arrived, 
the operators intensified the hardships of the workers by .reducing 
wages, blacklisting union members,and -imp0rting strikebreakers. 
The mine operators admitted that they were responsible for the 
appeal to the president, and they assumed that the administration was 
acting in their behalf. Funston undoubtedly thought so too, for he 
wired the Ad'jutant General that he understood his duty to be . the pro-
tection of the mines and th0se wh0 were working them, if the goverm>r 
d · d 33 so · es1.re · • This message caused a furor in Washington, · and Roosevelt, 
after a conference with the chief of staff, the Commissioner of Corpo-
rations and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Labor, sent 
Funston a sharp reminder that the troops we:re not to guard the ·mines 
nor to take any other action until orders to that effect were issued 
from the White House. 
In the meantime, Roosevelt, apparently not relying too heavily on 
the reports he received .from Funston ·and the officer in conunand at 
Goldfield, sent a special three man -investigating committee to Nevada. 
The committee found that Funston, .who ,had supp0rted the governor's 
call for troops, had given a distorted account of the situation to the 
administration. 34 No breakdown of civil authority was apparent, and 
the miners were not preparing an insurrection. In all probability, 
Funston was not really acquainted with the situation well enougli to 
make an adequate appraisal. The committee, consisting of Assistant 
Secretary ef Commerce and Labor Lawrence O. Murray, Commissioner 
33Rich, The Presiderrts and Civil Disorder, 128. 
34Ibid., 131. 
of Labor Charles P. Neill and Commissioner of Corporations 
Herbert Knox Smith, apparently dug deeper than Funston · and 
obt ained a more partial p:i:cture of the ,labor -disput e ~· Whereas 
Funston had reported that the miners' union -had driven 500 persons 
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from the area within two years, the committee asserted that not over -
25 such cases could be documented. As -for the collapse of civil 
authority, the committee found that none of the county officials had 
been consulted before the troops were called. 35 The investi-gators also 
learned that the mine operators had conspired ·to reduce wages but 
feared to put the pay cut into effect without the support of troops.36 
The bitter legacy of violence stemming from past labor disputes in the 
West had made them cautious. 
In reality, the only legal justification -for .federal intervention 
which the administration ·considered applicable tn this instance was a 
request from the convened legislature of Nevada, but Sparks refused t o 
call the legislature into session. He preferred to stall, f or ·the mere 
presence of troops at Goldfield strengthened the position of the in-
transigent operators. 37 When he finally called the members into session, 
the legislature:, withaut a dissenting vote, asked thc}.t the troops remain 
at Goldfield until a state force could be organized to police the area.. 
However, the dilatory tactics of the legislature and Governor Sparks 
delayed the withdrawal of Funston's detachment ·until March 7, 1907. 
The Goldfield incident displayed Funston's impatience for action. 
In the midst of a crisis, something had to be done; this aspect of his 
35Ibid~, 131. 
36Ibid •. , 133. 
37M · Th L f Th d R 1 9c.3 or·1s.on, e etters o . eo ore ooseve t ., u-· n. 
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character was evident in the Philippines and, later, at Vera Cruz. 
While.in command of the American forces on the Mexican border, Gener-
al Tasker Bliss noted Funston's eagerness to act; to seize the initi-
ative, regardless of the consequences.38 At other times, however, 
Funston shewed remarkable restraint and composure; as revealed by his 
overall record while in command at Vera Cruz and on the Rio Grande. 
In August, 1908, Funston left the Department of Cali.fornia to 
assume the command of the Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas. · In a humorous vein he wrote to William Allen White: l'I am a 
College President. Break it gently to the boys in the fraternity. 
Me a College President--my God? 1139 Among the amusing stories told 
about Funston was one which concerned the little general and Theodore 
Roosevelt. Roosevelt was known for.his .dare-devil stunts and he was 
equally notorious -for dragging his guests into dangerous feats to test 
their mettle. Wagenknecht commented on this practice; "One marvels at 
the spineless acquiesence with which most of' T. R.'s guests allowed 
him to dragoon them into these tortures.n40 Funston was a noted ex-
cepticm. "Come on, General," shouted Roosevelt, "you are not afraid . 
to swim the canal, are you?" "No I'm not afraid," retorted Funston, 
"and I am not a damned fool either. 1141 
Aft¢r'- a few. years of<f:l' relatively .placid existence; Funston returned 
38Memerandum, June 16, 1916, queted in Frederick Palmer, Bliss·, 
Peacemaker .(New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1934), 114-'115. 
3
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4CJ.Edward Wagenknecht, The Seven.Worlds of Theedore Roosevelt 
(New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1958), 15. 
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to ·the scene of his past.·glory, ,this ·time as commander .of the ;Depart-
ment of Luzon. The troeps .had been -equipped with sun helmets to 
·combat the tropicalrays, but many-of the men had,complained that the 
.headpieces were cumbersome in drill and.were heavywhen wet. In h:is 
report .for 1911, Funston :defended the much.criticized helmets, p0inting 
out ·that they afforded the wearer -some protection -from the burning sun 
and that they gave the men a neatappearance.42 The soldiers were at-
tached to the old campaign-hats, partly:, perhaps, for sentimental 
reasons. The hats, hewever; were,often abused because the average 
soldier took the ,first opportunity -to use his for-a pillow. After a 
few of·these treatments, they ,acquired a·.disreputable appearance .which 
caused the men to lose respect for themselves.43 Funston argued-that 
the British had supplied·their tropical units .with the sun helmets and 
had experienced no difficulty.with them. Certainly Amer-ican troQps 
could wear them under the same conditions. 
Funston's Philippine \tour terminated-in ·1913, and in April he 
took chaI'.ge of the Hawaiian. Department with .headquarters in Honolulu. 
In that year··new territorial units .were established .for the army, and 
the United States and ·its pes·sessions ·were ,divided into .six geographi-
cal departments--Eastern,.Central, Seuthern, Western, Hawaiian, and 
Philipp'ine~44 Funston -wielded more p0wer in :his ·new ca_pacity -than .he 
.had .formerly as .de.partmental commander, -.fer there had .previously been 
more departments, and, for a time) the departments were subject te the 
42Funston' s annual .report.:, War Depar-tment.-, .Anmial RepQrts, 1911·, 
volume 3:, ·211. 
43
.Ibid.,, 212-. 
44Ganoe., ·The Histocy .2f the United -States Army, 446. 
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jurisdiction of the division connnand. The new.organization was in the 
interests of greater effi'ciency ·and.effectiveness in time of war. 
The Mexican situation looked threatening at this time, and Funston 
was app0inted commander of the .Second Division at Texas .City in 
January, 1914. 45 There were other major changes in the ,army high com-
mand. Majer GeneralW. w. Wotherspoonwas elevated to chief of staff 
and Brigadier General.Hugh L. Scott was selected to .fill Wotherspoon's 
former position as assistant -chief of staff .• -Scott had been promoted 
from colonel scarcely a year before by President Wilson and it ·was 
generally believed that his -new.position would bring him the rank of 
Major General.46 
Scott was a former superintendent of the Military Academy at 
West Point arid his brother was .a.professor at Princeton-and an inti-
mate .friend of Wilson. ·Despite .his favorable circumstances, however, 
Scott .faced a prolonged Senate struggle if Wilson ,promoted him, .. for 
Funston's friends could hardly be expected to sanction the appoint-
ment ~4 7 In·· 1912 they· had blocked .for three· months the ·confirmation 
of Wotherspoon when he was made a Majer General. Wotherspoon was 
. only one of eleven officers who had been promoted over Funston. The 
latter had been the senior Brigadier General on the list since July 
16, 1902°. When Wotherspoon -was -selected to fill the vacancy left by 
the death of Major General Freder'ick Grant, the Denver Post quoted 
an unidentified Kansas Republican as stating that voters in the. 
western states·, especially in Kansas, Colorado, and California, would 
45Army-and -~ Journal, February 24, 1917·, ·P· 818. 
46New'York Times·, April 2; 1914, p. 6. 
47Tbid. 
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be reminded of -Taft's treatment -of their.hero. -In addition to his 
magnetic popular appeal, Funston had supporters among some of the 
western congressmen, including Senator William.E. Borah of Idaho who 
was a former colleague -at the University of Kansas. Other fellow 
students at Lawrence-included Vernon-Kellogg, who later became promi-
nent through,his work with the Belgian.relief project directed by 
Herbert Hoover, William Allen .White,-nationally known editor ·and 
proprietor .of the Emporia Gaze.tte, a .govern0r of Missouri, arf attorney-
general of Oklahema, and sev:era1noted businessmen and college pro-
f es.sors. 48 
Funston did not .seek support from influe~tial friends, at least 
not overtly, and there were some instances in which he declined the 
-assistance offered to him. As late as October, 1914, he wrote to 
Senator William H. Thompson-of Kansas that .he believed he would again 
be passed 0ver and that he guessed his ,''youth" was an obstacle to his 
promotion. "I used to<be young but have been getting over it at the 
· ·rate of 365 -days a year," he connnented; 49 However; he did not want 
the Sena tor· to make an-· issue of his sad. plight, al though h~ thanked 
Thompson ·.for his unsolicited appeal to ·the President and the Secretary 
of War. Some months before his death, Funston ·learned that Brigadier 
General Edward H. Plummer had written·to various congressmen in an at-
tempt to obtain a Lieutenant General's connnission -for him. At the time 
he had been a Major General less than two years and he did not want to 
antagonize or embarrass the .others of his rank by being elevated to 
48Wh·. A b. h 
· ite,; · uto 'iograp y. 
4~congressional Record," .64th Cong., 2nd Sess., volume 54, part 
4, 3973. 
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that exclusive level, so he squel·ched the movement.SO Funston had 
endured the resentment among the regular army officers when he re-
ceived his commission in 1901. He had risen rapidly .from -a col onel 
of volunteers, and he -realized the necessity of net pushing too fast 
and too far. Hence, he did not object when junior ·officers of l onger 
service were advanced over him on several occasions.51 Funston did 
not want his next promotion to be the object of vengeful criticism. 
Finally, in November, 1914, the long awaited appointment came and none 
came forward to dispute his promotion to Major General. Now no one 
said of him as General Henry C. C0rbin did in 1901; " ••• I am making 
lieutenants of better stuff than. Funston every day. Funston :is a 
boss scout--that' s all. n52 
In the spring of 1914, the antagonism between President Wilson 
and the Huerta regime in Mexico culminated in open intervention by 
United States forces with the :seizure of' the ;port .of Vera Cruz. Wilson·' s 
stubborn idealism would not allow him to follow the traditional Ameri-
can policy of recognizing de facto government~.53 Huerta had ·risen to 
p0wer over the dead body -of Francisco Madero, and was .apparently at-
tempting to restore order in his strife-torn land by establishing a 
centralized government reminiscent of the days of Porfirio Diaz. 
Wilson ·believed that the solution to Mexico 's problems. was to be 
found in strict adherence to democratic procedures; once an·. election 
50 . S Kansas City~, February 26, 1917·. 
I 
51Anny and ~ -Journal,, February 24, 1917, p. 8J.8. 
52Ibid . , April 13, 1901, p. 791. 
53H~ward Cline, The United States and Mexico {Cambridge, Harvard 
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was held in Mexico and a duly constituted government was erected, all 
would be well south 0f the -border. 54 Such vicious, f era:l characters 
as Zapata and Villa would then .presumably abandon their bloody tactics 
and accept a representative democracy in the grand 0ld Angle-American 
tradition. Wilson did not perceive the unreality in his policy of ap-
plying the western politica·1 heritage to a nation which was just 
·emerging from a near-feudal state. 
In this strained atmosphere, a relatively minor incident was seized 
upon by the administration as justification for a: rather obvious at-
tempt to unseat Huerta. Seven American sailors and an officer were 
arrested in Tampica while on official business. When the extreme a·nd 
humiliati~g demands of the United States for a twenty-one ~un salute 
of the American flag we~e rejected, Wilson intervened by directing the 
navy to occupy Vera Cruz. This action was substituted for the contem-
plate.d naval demonstration at Tampico because Wilson had learned that 
a German ship was approaching Vera Cruz with a cargo of arms and ammu-,. 
nition for Huerta. 56 Although the shipment of war material was not un-
loaded at Vera Cruz, it eventually reached the Huerta forces through 
another Mexican port.57 
The landing at Vera Cruz took place in the morning of April 21, 
1914, and, after a few days of sp0radic ·fighting, Admiral F.F. Fletcher, 
commanding the American forces, p~oclaimed Robert J. Kerr the Civil 
54Ibid., 140. 
55Guy Renfro Donnell, ffThe United States Intervention in Mexico, 
1914," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1951), 
184--185. 
56Cline, The United States and Mexica, 158. - :: 
57Donnell, "The United States Intervention in Mexico, 1914," 232. 
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Governor of the city. 58 In the meantime, General Funston had been 
ordered to Vera Cruz with as much of the Fifth Brigade of the Second 
Division as could be accommodated by the available transports.59 He 
and his command arrived on April 28, and two days later the army took 
over the administration of Vera Cruz. Neither the President nor the 
.Secretary of War had approved of placing a civilian in charge of the 
city's government.60 
On April 30, Funston set up a system of Provost Courts which had 
jurisdiction over criminal law as defined by the Criminal Code of the 
Republic of Mexico, the municipality of Vera Cruz, the statutes of 
the United States, and the common law.61 Capital offenses and politi-
cal crimes were .not included in the jurisdiction of these courts, arid 
neither were United States military pers<:mnel. The maximum sentence 
that could be imposed by the superior Provost Court was a fine of 
3,000 pesos or three years imprisonment or both.62 The courts were 
composed of commissioned officers of the U.. S. Army. The judicial 
procedure was the same as in the courts of the United States. C<.>mpany 
commanders and higher officers on police duty were authorized to 
58Proclamation by Admiral F. F. Fletcher, April 28, 1914, in 
Record Group No. 141, Records of the MilitaryGovernment of Vera Cruz, 
(Classified Files, United States Fritervention· in Vera Cru~(hereafter 
referred to -as Record Group No. 141), Bureau of Insular Affairs of 
the War Department, National Archives. Photostatic copies obtained 
by Guy Renfro Donnell supplied to the author. 
59war Department, Annual Reports, 1914, volume 1, 135. 
60Donnell, "The United States Intervention in Mexico, 1914," 240. 
61 General Orders No. 2-, is sued by General Funston, April 30, 1914, 
in Record Group No. 141. 
62Ibid. 
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investigate ·infractions of the law in their districts. They could 
release an offender if they considered the evidence against him in-
sufficient or ·they ·could .prosecute him.in the Provost Courts.63 All 
. persons charged with offenses had a right to ·be crepresented by counsel 
and were ,guaranteed a speedy trial. .The judgments of the Pirc.wost 
Courts were final. 
On May 2:, Funstou ·anmmnced himself as the Military Governor of 
Vera -Cruz, in compliance with instructions from Washington. The Mili-
tary G.evernment, stated .Funston, .would continue the administrative 
system·to which the people of the city were accustomed, as far as was 
consistent with·military control. The new organization was described 
as ,follows by Funston: 64 
2. There ·shall be a Provost Marshal General. He will 
institute, or continue in force, the usual departments 
of city government. He will make request to ·the Military 
Governor for the detail of officers to be ,placed .in charge 
of the .principal departments and bureaus; and.for such 
other .officers .as may be necessary. 
3. In the exercise of police p0wers the Provost.Marshal 
General will continue ·for the present·, the Provost courts 
instituted by General Orders, No. 2, .from these head-
quarters, dated April 30, · 1914. 
4. The Judge Advocate at these Headquarters is appointed 
Admiriistra tor of Justice. Upon his recommend.a tion the 
Military Governor will establish courts for the tria1 of 
civil causes. 
5. The ,funds .received from :whatever sources will be de-
posited in the Treasury and credited ·to the proper fund. 
The current and necessary expenses of the military and 
civil government shall be paid on:requisition·from the 
proper ,departments or·bureaus approved by the Military 
Governor. 
63Ibid •. , Record Group No. 141. 
64General Orders No •. 3, ·issued .by General Funston, May 2, 1914, 
in Recard Group No. 141. 
6. The following administrative offices are exempt from 
the control of the Provost Marshal General and are under 
the innnediate control of the Military Governor: 
a. The Treasury. 
b. Customs, including Light House Service. 
c. The Civil Courts. 
d. The U. S. Mail Agency and the General Post Off ice. 
The office of the Provost Marshal General was composed of six 
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departments; Legal, Public Works, Public -Safety, Education, Finance, 
and Purchase and Inspection of Supplies. These were staffed by army 
officers, but naval officers were appointed by Funston to administer 
the customs and supervise the port of Vera Cruz. The Mexicans had 
destroyed the records which might have guided the new appointees in 
their duties, and competent Mexican employees were difficult to ob-
tain for the penal code of their nation prescribed severe penalities 
-for those who collaborated with a foreign power in occupation of 
M . . 6-5 exican territory. Even school teachers were reluctant to return 
to their pos-i tions. Especially was ·the administration of justice 
hampered by this factor. The Americans could dispose of criminal 
cases after a fashion, but civil suits were complicated by the fact 
that it was considered improbable that the Mexican government which 
would follow the army evacuation would recognize the judgments of 
American courts as valid. Mexican judges could not be readily induced 
to serve. However, there was some agitation for the establishment of 
Courts of the First Instance which legalized real estate transfers, 
wills,and various other public ·docurnents because they were a source 
of ·revenue which was lost to the city of Vera Cruz when the Mexicans 
transacted such business elsewhere. Apparently, it was believed that 
65nonnell, "The United States Ii:itervention ·in Mexico, 1914, 11 244. 
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Mexican officials could, in this case, be persuaded to serve.66 
General Funston ·instituted a crusade against vice, which had 
increased after the occupation by the military forces. The operation 
of gambling houses was prohibited, and prostitution was restricted to 
women of Mexican nationality. Cocaine and marihuana could be sold 
only with a doctor's prescription. The citizens were warned that 
-spitting in public ·places .made them ·liable to prosecution in the 
.Provost Courts. All garbage was ·to be placed in covered receptacles. 
That the army campaign to clean up the city was -effective can be 
decumented by the steadily decreasing rate of sick calls among mili-
tary personnel which Wotherspoon reported on June 30. 67 
Another thorny problem which .faced the Military Governor was ·the 
collection -of federal, state, and local taxes, and the customs duties. 
The administration -of the three levels of taxes was entrusted to the 
Finance Department. Once again, the unfamiliarity of the American 
officers with Mexican procedure prompted an appeal to the former em-
ployees of the tax offices to return to their jobs. Some of them 
were lured back to their vacated pasitions by American guarantees 
that they -were net obligated to discharge their duties in case actual 
warfare ensued between the United States and Mexico. Until then, the 
Americans argued, they would not be guilty ef crimes against their 
country. However, there was not enough cooperation -from the Mexicans 
to enable the Military Government to do an ,adequate job of collecting 
taxes. The citizens of the city -feared that after the occupation ·they 
66H. H. Basham to Captain H.B. Fiske, July 21, 1914, in Record 
Group No. 141. 
67war Department, Annual Reports, 1914, volume 1, 135. 
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would be required to pay the same taxes to the Mexican government. 
Most of the important records pertaining to the operation of the 
customshouse and the status of the merchandise stored in the ware-
houses were destroyed, and, as usual, the Mexican employees .could not 
be enticed back to their former capacities. The warehouses had been 
looted and further damage was done by American troops in their search 
for arms and annnunition. To complicate what was already a formidable 
task, many merchants objected to paying duties to the American operated 
customshouse. The importers were also required to pay additional im-
p0sts on goods to the Mexican government, since the acts of the mili-
tary government in Vera Cruz were not deemed legal. 68 Upon -his acces-
sion to power, Carranza ordered this duplicate taxation to,,ceas~, but 
it continued to -be the practice, although ort a limited scale. One re-
sult of the customs confusion -at Vera Cruz was the redirection of 
commerce to other ports. When asked about the disposition of the 
customs receipts, Funston -admitted .he was uncertain. It was estimated 
that in normal times a million ·dollars in duties was received every 
'th 69 mon • 
At Vera Cruz, Funston -had to combine great powers of organization 
with patience and moderation. When he first arrived, the old Funston 
was revealed when he advocated seizing a bridge on the Interoceanic 
Railway leading to Mexico City. 70 He believed the bridge, which .was 
27 miles from Vera Cruz, would be vital in case the American forces 
68nonnell, "The United States Intervention in Mexico, 1914, " 261. 
69 Anon., "The Taking of Vera Cruz and What Followed," American Re-
view of Reviews, I~~ (June, 1914), 670. 
70ibid., 669. 
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advanced on the capital. Washington -refused to allow such a venture 
and on May ·l7 the Mexicans blew up the bridge. However, if Funston 
thought in terms of a projected invasion -of Mexico, he -could hardly 
be blamed. The .general staff had drawn up a plan- of war which in-
eluded the evacuation of Vera Cruz as soon as that port was .;secured, 
and an -advance into the healthier interior ·plateau, some -50 miles in-
land. To carry out this scheme, the bridges on the railroad would 
have had to be seized ·intact. -71 In another display ·of belligerence 
Funston, when -informed politely by the Mexican commander outside Vera 
Cruz that he feared he would be unable to restrain his troops any 
longer, replied: "If you can't hold your troops back, I can. 1172 
In the last analysis, however, Funston performed admirably while 
in command of the city. When :he was sent to Vera Cruz, many expected 
him to "start something11 • 73 Despite the pressure under which he was 
operating, Funston obeyed orders. The city was crowded with foreign 
refugees who shouted for war and cursed the army -for not capturing 
Mexico City and rescuing their office furniture or their new cash 
register.74 Sentries were insulted, soldiers were kidnapped, camps 
were -raided, and one American ·in Funston's command was killed and his 
remains burned. The Mexicans had also threatened -to cut off the water 
supply of the city. Despite the provocations .he was .forced to endure, 
the general kept his head and even won the respect and admiration o.f 
71Ibid., 669. 
72Anon., "He Snared Aguinaldo," Literary Digest, LIV (March 10, 
1917), 644. 
73Ibid., 644. 
74Richard Harding Davis, "When a War is not a War," Scri·bners 
Magazine, LVI (July, 1914), 48. 
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some of the Mexicans. Colonel Edmundo Martinez, who succeeded Funston 
in command of Vera Cruz when the Americans ended the occupation, 
praised his conduct. "Gen. Funston has done more than any other Ameri-
can to increase and develop the friendship of Mexicans for Americans. 
He is particularly admired because of his ability in conducting the 
difficult negotiations while in coinmand of Vera Cruz. 11 75 
Illustrative of the diplomatic and political morass of· the Ameri-
can occupation -were the comments of a journalist who was present during 
the period preceding Funston's arrival when the navy controlled the 
city. In a note of nostalgia, he described the sounding of retrea·t at 
sunset at which time the flag was supposed to be lowered. Americans 
rose from their sidewalk tables and stood rigidly facing the flag pole; 
In their mind's eye, creeping slowly down the pole they 
saw an American flag. But nobody else saw it. At other 
tables were officers and men of British, French, and 
Spanish war-ships. They noted the attitude of the 
American officers, they also tried to see an American 
flag creeping down the pole, but they had not been 
trained in the diplomatic ethics of Washington. So 
they apologetically shrugged their shoulders and re-
mained seated. So also did every Mexican,76 
The situation was .probably confusing to quite a few others be-
sides the whimsical journalist. The United States flag was raised 
finally on April 27, 1914. 
In July, Victoriano Huerta resigned arid Wilson achieved a 
victory of sorts. His successor, Venustiano Carranza, pushed .for 
the evacuation of Vera Cruz. On September 15, Wilson directed his 
Secretary of War to prepare for the immediate withdrawal of United 
States forces from the city. However, before the evacuation was 
75New York Times, December 22, 1914, p. 8. 
76navis, ''When A War is not a War," 45-46. 
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effected, Wilson exacted a promise that the Mexicans who had worked 
in official capacities unde.r the military government would not be 
subject to reprisals .from the Mexican government or local citizens. 
Wilson was also assured that those who had paid taxes and ·customs 
duties to the military government would be exempt from further pay-
t f th · d d d·t· 77 mens or e same per10 an . connno 1 1es. A few refugees and 
Mexican nationals were given transportation out of the city, as were 
the priests and nuns who -requested aid in leaving Vera Cruz.78 
On November 20, Funston ·received orders regarding the evacuation. 
He was to take with him all funds held by the military government, in-
eluding taxes and customs duties; also all records necessary to es-
tablish the integrity and accuracy of his administration. Especially, 
he was directed to make no arrangements with Mexican authorities out-
side the city, and ·no declarations which could be construed as giving 
United States recognition to .Carranza or any other leader who claimed 
jurisdiction over the city. 79 On November 23, ·1914, the United States 
forces withdrew from Vera Cruz . 
Funston had no sympathy for the "watchful waiting" policy of 
Wilson. He expressed his opinion on the subject to William Allen 
White in the last meeting of the two old friends. The general came 
to White's house in a torrential rain and was admitted, dripping wet; 
77New ~ Times, December 22·, 1914, p. 8. 
78Ibid., 1. 
79Acting Secretary of War Brechinridge to General Funston, 
November 20, 1914, in Record Group No. 126, Records of Bureau of Insu-
lar Affairs of the War Department, Classified Files, ·United States 
Intervention in Mexico, 1914, National Archives. Photostatic copies 
obta.ined by Guy Renfro Donnell supplied to the author. 
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·.he sat down before the .. fire .an,~ burst out =in :bitter profanity. After 
he had cursed himself· into .repose, tears .filled .his ·eyes-. · He then 
told White his story: 
Billy, ·you .won't--l)_elieve -it. I never. thought I would 
have to ·do-it •. God·knows :it cut my-heart.out but I had 
to ·retire American tro.ops :in order, -under· the sniping .fire 
of th0~e 'Liiere-he burst into;a ,set piece of pyrotechnic 
profamty •••. greasers '.from :windows as we ·emba:rked. God, 
Billy, fancy tha:tl :Fancy, the American ,flag; with me in 
charge.of it:, going meekly out of a,d;irty, stinking, 
·. greaser ,h01e,-".'."withdrawi:hg my connnand under firel8() 
Funston -was .scornful of Witson's bluff; .he had more -respect for 
Huerta when he -called -the ,bluff~ 81 His .a·cco~nt o.f the Mexican snipers 
·. . .. 
was ·in sharp-contrast to ·the ,genera.l bei~ef that the -evacuation .was 
. with0ut :incident. .Funston' s antipathy ·toward ·the administration's 
policy made his .creditable _performanc.e -all the ·.m0-re laudable. .In 
true army.fashion,· he had not allowed pe~sonal -convictions to inter-
fere.-with his duty. 
On a ,more .somber, :note,.· White ,described .Funston' s .departure on 
that bleak day. As .he went out in -the rain, the general turned back, 
saw White .lingering at ·the ··,door., .·waved his.band and gave the satne old 
gay -smile. 82 . ·"God· bless you, old -timet_)n .·shouted .. Billy. "Same to 
· you, Billy, you old hell-raiser:," .the .gen¢ral. re.plied. SJ So ·saying, 
. Frederick Funston ·turned and :disirppea-red -.fc,rever ·into .the twilight-
· mist;84 
8Cwhite; Autobiogra.phy, · 502. 
81tbid. ·' 
82.Ibid. 
83.Ibid. 
84Ibid. 
CONCLUSION 
In-February, 1915, ·Funston assumed command of the Southern 
Department with 'headquarters at Fort Sam,Houston, Texas. A.year 
later he was given charge of the -entire ·military,force-along the 
-Mexican·border., .from Texas to California. 1 In this-capacity, Funston 
proved·that he had the ability·to,handle an:army. Previously, his 
conmands :had :been -small and •the crises of short duration. At Fort 
Sam Houston, however., he took care of 150.,000 menalong 2,.000 miles 
of border ·during many months of tension ·between the United States.and 
~ 2 . Mexico. -The troops -had·to be.fed, clothed-and trained. Funston-was 
burdened with a .huge volume of. paper work, much of, which .ha,d ·to :be 
·carefully-examined.for many of the officers commanding the various 
uni ts were from· the militia and. were ignorant . of army. red tape.. As 
the troops poured,into the department., Funston·had,to -organize them 
into -regiments., brigades .and·divisions. COIIIInanding a·tra:ined army 
of this .size·would be ,a .. task, but these -soldiers came in widely 
varied-units .from.forty or more·states, and most of them·ha.d not the 
barest rudiments of military ·trainil\g.'3 
Difficulties .with ·Mexico alrtro;st; brought war ·in ·,1916 when :Pancho 
Villa crossed the border lnto ,Columbus, New Mexico and shCiit · down 
1New Yor~ Times, Februa:r-y 20, '1917,, ··p. 5. 
2Tbid •. , February 25., 191·7:, V •. , p. 2. 
3
··Ib"·d 
··~· 
7-J 
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everyone in sight in broad daylight.4 After a brush with an American 
cavalry -patrol, the Villistas disappeared into the Chihuahua hills:, 
but the .public was outraged and a demand -for retaliation against these 
bandits arose across the land. On March -16, 1916, General John J. 
Pershing, by order of President Wilson, crossed the border with 6000 
men in -pursuit of Villa. 5 Funston had recommended the "punitive ex-
pedition" and had asked to command it.6 Although he said nothing for 
publication, he chafed at the bungling attempts to capture Villa. How-
ever, when the War Department informed him that he could set the date 
for the evacuation of Pershing's force from Mexico, he could not con-
tain himself. At a public .dinner at Corpus Christi, Texas, he ex-
ploded; "They can't 'pass the buck' to me that way. If the Pershing 
expedition is to be withdrawn, the orders .for its withdrawal will 
come from Washington. 117 In this statement, one can detect Funston's 
old forthrightness which had only been obscured for a time by his 
mantle of circumspection. 
Frederick Funston died on February 19, 1917, while dining in 
the St. Anthany ·hotel in San Antonio. Had he lived, he would have 
been the most likely choice to .command the American Expeditionary 
Force. Palmer, the biographer of Pershing, commented: 11A heartbeat, 
Major General Frederick Funston's, had been between Pershing and the 
future command in France. 118 However, Funston's health was such that 
4Cline, The United States and Mexico, 176. 
5Ibid. , 177. 
6New York Times, February 25, 1917, V, p. 2. 
7Ibid., 2. 
8Frederick Palmer, John J. Pershing (Harrisburg, Pa., The Mili-
tary Service Publishing Company, ·1948), 73. 
75 
-he c0uld hardly have stirvi ved ·the . strain on the western .. front. 9 
Fu.nston's -merit ·as a military leader -lay ·in·.his :administrative 
ability and·his unquestiona:ble courage. He had ·n0 opportunity to 
demonstrate ·.his capacity as a ,strategist, but then ,neither did 
Pershing -until 1917. While at times ,he seemed head.strong and,irre-
· sponsible .in his pub],.ic utterances, he was -cQmposed .and ,deliberate 
in action, as -evidenced by his sh0wiug at Vera .Cruz-. :Yet, tact is 
an essential quality :in a situation sucn as Pershing .faced·-in France • 
. Perha·ps ·the -·most adequate a:ppraisa1 .of -Funston .was .:printed -in,,The 
Nation sh0·rtly ·after the general's -death: -"F'unston·was not a ,g-reat 
man-, -but a man of resources, :who ·knew what to ·do in an' emergency 
and did it without the loss .of· an ,hour. nlO 
9Ibid., 74. 
10.rat"'t;ler.; . .(Psued.o.}, "General F-u.nsto?!, 11 ·.The Nation, -CIV (March 
.1, 1917}, 248. 
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